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NOTES
VIVA ZAPATA!: TOWARD A RATIONAL
SYSTEM OF FORUM-SELECTION CLAUSE
ENFORCEMENT IN DIVERSITY CASES
LEANDRA LEDERMAN
INTRODUCTION
Parties who memorialize agreed-upon rights and obligations in con-
tracts generally do so to impose enforceability on their agreements. 2 A
written contract assists somewhat in clarifying the parties' expectations.
However, different forums may reach divergent interpretations of a writ-
ten contract. In a multi-state or international agreement, in which per-
sonal jurisdiction and proper venue exists in many places,3 it may be
impossible to predict where a plaintiff will file suit.4 To reduce this un-
certainty, 5 control litigation coSts, 6 and minimize potential tactical ad-
I See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
2 See id. at 13; Gruson, Forum-Selection Clauses in International and Interstate Commer-
cial Agreements, 1982 U. Ill. L. Rev. 133, 133; Comment, Forum Selection Clauses in Light of
the Erie Doctrine and Federal Common Law: Stewart Organization v. Ricoh Corporation, 72
Minn. L. Rev. 1090, 1092 (1988).
3 Modem jurisdictional statutes generally give a court personal jurisdiction over
nondomiciliaries where the defendant or the transaction has any significant connection with
the state. The New York long-arm statute is typical. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. 302(a)
(McKinney 1990) (jurisdiction properly premised on transaction of business within state, com-
mission of tortious act within state, commission of tortious act outside state causing injury
within state if certain other requirements are met, or ownership of real property in state).
A federal court sitting in diversity applies the jurisdictional statutes of the state in which it
is located. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e). Where the requirements of the applicable statute are met,
the court then only needs to determine that the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts
with the state to comport with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). The Judicial Improvements Act
of 1990, which, among other things, conflated venue with personal jurisdiction, has broadened
the venue options in federal courts. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
650, § 311, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990); note 31 infra.
4 See Gruson, supra note 2, at 133 ("Absent... [advance] selection of a forum, one party
could sue the other in any forum that would assert jurisdiction over the other party and over
the subject matter of the litigation."); see also Comment, supra note 2, at 1092 ("Litigation
over a contract dispute provides an area of potential uncertainty because under federal venue
statutes, which prescribe where parties may initiate an action in federal courts, the forum for
contract litigation could be in any of several different courts.").
5 See Gordonsville Indus. v. American Artos Corp., 549 F. Supp. 200, 205 (W.D. Va.
1982) ("By including [the forum-selection clause] in the contract, the two parties eliminated
the uncertainties and great inconveniences that both parties could confront by being forced to
adjudicate the contract in a forum [un]familiar to both parties."); Comment, supra note 2, at
422
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vantages to plaintiffs,7 sophisticated parties8 may bargain over the situs
of future litigation when negotiating the contract.9 A contractual clause
that establishes which forum will hear disputes arising from the contract
commonly is known as a forum-selection clause.'0
1093 ("Specifying the forum and choice of law allows the parties to negotiate with certainty as
to the cost and convenience of litigation.").
6 See Comment, Stewart Organization v. Ricoh Corp.: Judicial Discretion in Forum Selec-
tion, 41 Rutgers L. Rev. 1379, 1382 n.13 (1989) (advance agreement on forum for litigation
may serve as cost-control measure).
7 See Gruson, supra note 2, at 133 ("The forum selected by a plaintiff may be very incon-
venient for the defendant, and the freedom of the plaintiff to select a forum creates uncertainty
and unpredictability for the defendant."); cf. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redun-
dancy of Court-Access Doctrine, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 781, 783 (1985) ("The choice of forum
has... become a key strategic battle fought to increase the chances of prevailing on the
merits.").
8 Certainly sophisticated businesspeople are more likely to bargain over the forum for
future litigation than are other contracting parties. It is probably for this reason that propo-
nents of forum-selection clauses often address only those contracts made by parties with so-
phistication in business. See, e.g., Note, The Enforceability of Forum-Selection Clauses After
Stewart Organization, Inc, v. Ricoh Corporation, 6 Alaska L. Rev. 175, 177 n.9 (1989) (Note
limited to forum-selection clauses in contracts between sophisticated business parties).
9 See Gruson, supra note 2, at 133; Comment, supra note 2, at 1092-93; see also The
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1972) ("The elimination of... uncertain-
ties by agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable to both parties is an indispensable element in
international trade, commerce, and contracting.").
Parties also may include a choice-of-law clause in the contract, specifying the body of law
that will govern contract disputes. See note 10 infra; see also Juenger, Supreme Court Valida-
tion of Forum-Selection Clauses, 19 Wayne L. Rev. 49, 50 (1972) ("Viewed realistically, choice
of law and choice of forum are but two more terms on which agreement must be reached.").
10 A typical forum-selection clause might read: "[B]oth parties agree that only the New
York Courts shall have jurisdiction over this contract and any controversies arising out of this
contract." Elkin v. Austral Am. Trading Corp., 10 Misc. 2d 879, 879, 170 N.Y.S.2d 131, 132
(Sup. Ct. 1957). Such a clause also may be called a "choice-of-forum provision" or "forum
clause." See Gruson, supra note 2, at 136 n.4. This Note uses "forum-selection clause" and
"choice-of-forum provision" (or clause) interchangeably.
A "non-exclusive" or "permissive" forum-selection clause, also called a "consent to juris-
diction" clause, merely specifies a court empowered to hear the litigation, in effect waiving any
objection to personal jurisdiction or venue. Such a clause might provide: "[Tihe parties submit
to the jurisdiction of the courts of New York." Keaty v. Freeport Indonesia, Inc., 503 F.2d
955, 956 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam). Such a clause is "permissive" since it allows the parties
to air any dispute in that court, without requiring them to do so.
Foram-selection clauses sometimes are confused with choice-of-law provisions, which
generally embody the agreement of the parties as to what law will govern the interpretation of
the contract. A typical choice-of-law provision provides: 'This agreement shall be governed
by, and construed in accordance with, the law of the State of New York." Covey & Morris,
The Enforceability of Agreements Providing for Forum and Choice of Law Selection, 61 Den-
ver L.J. 837, 850 (1984); Gruson, Governing-Law Clauses in International and Interstate Loan
Agreements-New York's Approach, 1982 U. 1I. L. Rev. 207, 207 n.4. Although it might
seem that a forum-selection clause would obviate the need for a contractual choice-of-law
provision, the two clauses serve quite different functions. A forum-selection clause can prevent
trial in a distant, unfavorable, or otherwise inconvenient forum. See Gruson, supra note 2, at
133. A choice-of-law clause determines only the substantive law that will govern the litigation.
For example, if a California court honors a choice-of-law clause providing for the application
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Modem courts and commentators recognize that forum-selection
clauses advance many important public policies. The enforcement of
reasonable" forum-selection clauses protects the expectations of con-
tracting parties, 12 preserves the equities of the agreement, 13 respects free-
dom of contract, 14 encourages trade,15 and conserves judicial resources
by limiting pretrial struggles over where to litigate. 16 However, as the
amount of litigation 17 over forum-selection clauses illustrates, the stan-
of New York law, the California court still can retain jurisdiction over the lawsuit. Id. Of
course, the parties may specify the same jurisdiction for choice-of-law and choice-of-forum
purposes. See id.
11 This Note does not argue that all forum-selection clauses should be enforced reflexly,
without regard for the reasonableness of doing so. The best solution would be a return to the
standards articulated in The Bremen. See text accompanying note 22 infra; note 78 and ac-
companying text infra. However, this Note concludes that the Erie line of cases compels the
application of state law to forum-selection clauses, even though this approach may result in the
use of a different standard. See text accompanying note 23 infra. For a proposed solution to
this dilemma, see note 78 infra.
12 See, e.g., Gruson, supra note 2, at 156 ("If the parties to an agreement stipulate that the
courts of a specified foreign country shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all disputes, they
intend to exclude the jurisdiction of all other foreign courts and of all United States federal and
state courts that otherwise have... jurisdiction. .. "); Comment, supra note 6, at 1382 n.13
(advance agreement on forum helps parties anticipate how costly litigation will be). Of course,
if the opposing party consents to the change in forum, the parties' agreement is not under-
mined at all and the parties should be entitled to proceed in the newly selected forum. See,
e.g., Krenger v. Pennsylvania R.R., 174 F.2d 556, 560-61 (2d Cir.) (Hand, J., concurring)
(noting that contractual forum-selection clauses agreed to after cause of action had accrued
had been enforced), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 866 (1949); Herrington v. Thompson, 61 F. Supp.
903, 904-05 (D. Mo. 1945) (absent misrepresentation, fraud, or mistake, venue may be subject
of contractual agreement where cause of action has accrued). But cf. Akerly v. New York C.
R., 168 F.2d 812, 813-15 (6th Cir. 1948) (provision entered into after cause of action arose was
within rule that contract limiting access to court was against public policy).
13 See, e.g., Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1075 (11th Cir. 1987) (en
bane) (Tjoflat, J., concurring) ("The law of contracts presumes that Ricoh has already com-
pensated Stewart, through lowered costs or some other method, for any inconvenience that
Stewart or its witnesses might suffer by trying the case in New York."), rev'd on other
grounds, 487 U.S. 22 (1988); TUC Elecs. v. Eagle Telephonics, 698 F. Supp. 35, 39 (D. Conn.
1988) ('[W]here parties have freely agreed upon a particular forum for their disputes, it is
presumed that each party has been compensated by the bargain for any inconvenience it might
suffer by resort to that forum."); D'Antuono v. Computax Sys., 570 F. Supp. 708, 713 (D.R.I.
1983) ("The better-reasoned view is that the plaintiff, by consenting to inclusion of the forum
designation in the agreements, has in effect subordinated his convenience to the bargain.");
Comment, supra note 2, at 1093 n.16 ('If a court does not enforce the forum selection clause,
the equities of the agreement may be shifted.").
14 See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 11; Gruson, supra note 2, at 151.
15 See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9; Note, Forum-Selection Clauses: Should State or Federal
Law Determine Validity in Diversity Actios?-Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108
S. Ct. 2239 (1988), 64 Wash. L. Rev. 439, 440 (1989).
16 See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 33 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[forum-selection clauses] relieve
courts of time consuming pretrial motions").
17 See Comment, supra note 2, at 1091 n.9 (1988 Westlaw search for cases on forum-
selection clauses since 1980 produced 211 federal cases and 50 state cases).
The Supreme Court has decided three forum-selection clause cases in the past three years.
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dards for enforceability are by no means clear.18 Ironically, whether a
forum-selection clause is honored may depend on where the plaintiff
brings suit,19 a state of affairs that may encourage parties to race to the
courthouse and may discourage amicable dispute resolution.20
This Note argues that all valid2' forum-selection clauses should be
enforced under a standard similar to that established by the Supreme
Court in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.-2 The Note recognizes,
See Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522, 1524-25 (1991) (forum-selection clause on
passenger ticket enforceable in admiralty under The Bremen although passengers did not re-
ceive tickets until after paying fare); Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 497 (1989)
(denial of 12(bX3) motion to dismiss based on forum-selection clause not entitled to interlocu-
tory review); Stewart, 487 U.S. at 32 (determination of whether to grant § 1404(a) transfer
must be based primarily on § 1404(a) factors, not state policies or other federal law).
18 See notes 215-33 and accompanying text infra.
19 See Note, supra note 8, at 186 (noting this problem which may result from courts' diver-
gent treatment of forum-selection clauses).
The importance of proper treatment of forum-selection clauses at the trial court level
increased when the Supreme Court held that there is no right of interlocutory review of a
denial of a 12(bX3) motion to enforce a forum-selection clause. See Lauro Lines, 490 U.S. at
496. Review of these motions after final judgment has always been limited as a practical mat-
ter. See notes 90-101 and accompanying text infra.
20 If a party realizes that the contractual relationship is disintegrating and that she can
gain the upper hand by being the one to file suit, she may be quicker to commence litigation
than she otherwise would be.
21 A "valid" forum-selection clause is one that has not been tainted by fraud, undue influ-
ence, or overweening bargaining power. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1,
12-13 (1972) (finding "compelling reasons" to enforce only forum-selection clauses not affected
by these defects in bargaining process). Clauses defective in one of these ways, or otherwise
unreasonable, should not be enforced. Thus, as used in this Note, an "enforceable" clause is
per se a "valid" one.
Some recent cases have manifested understandable reluctance to enforce forum-selection
clauses contained in obvious contracts of adhesion, such as when written on a passenger ticket.
See, e.g., Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 388-89 & n.1 1(9th Cir. 1990) (forum-
selection clause in passenger ticket unenforceable, particularly where purchasers did not have
notice of provision as they received ticket after purchasing cruise), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1522
(1991); Chasser v. Achille Lauro Lines, 844 F.2d 50, 52 (2d Cir. 1988) (denying interlocutory
review of district court's refusal to enforce forum-selection clause appearing "in tiny type" on
passenger ticket), aff'd sub nom. Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495 (1989). But see
Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro ed Altri-Gestione, 858 F.2d 905, 910 (3d Cir. 1988) (forum-
selection clause in passenger ticket, although in small print, was readable and thus enforcea-
ble), cert. dismissed, 490 U.S. 1001 (1989).
The Supreme Court may have reversed the tide when, in a recent admiralty case, it en-
forced a forum-selection clause on a passenger ticket that was mailed to the plaintiff after she
paid the fare. The Court held that The Bremen does not require that all forum-selection
clauses that are not the product of bargaining be held unenforceable. See Carnival Cruise
Lines v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522, 1527 (1991).
It should be up to the party seeking to avoid enforcement to plead and prove fraud or
overreaching by the other party. See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10-11, 15 (rule of prima facie
validity applies to forum-selection clauses; party seeking to litigate in non-contractual forum
bears "heavy burden" of showing invalidity or unreasonableness of clause); see also Gruson,
supra note 2, at 149 (explaining "heavy burden" standard).
22 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
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however, that under the analysis required by Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins,23 state law applies to these clauses, which may require the
application of a standard other than that applied in The Bremen. Ac-
cordingly, the Note offers suggestions for obtaining enforcement of fo-
rum-selection clauses within the present system.
Section A of Part I examines courts' historical antipathy to forum-
selection clauses, as well as the Supreme Court's about-face in The
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. 24 The Bremen's continuing influence on
federal forum-selection clause cases,25 it is argued, stems from its formu-
lation of a sensible test for forum-selection clause enforcement, a test far
more receptive to forum-selection clauses than any applied previously.
The post-Bremen revolution, which created a procedural tangle in the
absence of a codified "Zapata motion"-a motion designed specifically
for forum-selection clause enforcement 26 -is discussed in Section B of
Part I.
Part II of this Note focuses on the conflict-of-laws issues raised by
forum-selection clauses. Section A of this Part considers whether Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins 27 counsels against the application of federal law to
forum-selection clauses; it then discusses Stewart Organization, Ina v.
Ricoh Corp.,28 which addressed this question in the context of a motion
to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The Note argues that Stew-
art was decided wrongly and that its tenuous Erie analysis is explicable
as a response to lower courts' willy-nilly overenforcement of forum-selec-
tion clauses. Since Stewart may be limited to the context of a motion
under section 1404(a), the Note argues that state law should apply to
other forum-selection clause motions. Section B of Part II discusses
which state law should be applied to a forum-selection clause and ex-
plores the effect of a choice-of-law clause on that analysis.
23 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
24 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
25 The Bremen continues to be cited, in admiralty as well as non-admiralty cases, even after
the pivotal Supreme Court decision that retreated from its teachings. See Stewart Org., Inc. v.
Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 23 (1988) (agreeing with court of appeals that The Bremen is "in-
structive" in determining whether to enforce forum-selection clause but stating that determina-
tive inquiry is whether § 1404(a) counsels enforcement); notes 186-87, 233 and accompanying
text infra. In a recent admiralty case, the Supreme Court applied The Bremen to uphold a
forum-selection clause printed on a passenger ticket. See Carnival Cruise Lines, 111 S. Ct. at
1525.
26 This Note employs the term "Zapata motion" to refer to a uniform motion to enforce a
forum-selection clause. The motion, contained in a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, would be
based on a federal statute incorporating a standard similar to that in The Bremen, and would
ensure the application of a uniform body of law to forum-selection clauses. For a discussion of
the mechanics and constitutionality of this procedure, see note 78 and accompanying text
infra.
27 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
28 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
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Part HI analyzes the approach most likely to be effective within the
present system and suggests courses of action for practitioners who wish
to see their forum-selection clauses enforced. The Note concludes that
careful drafting of forum-selection and choice-of-law clauses will en-
hance the likelihood of forum-selection clause enforcement.
I
THE EVOLUTION OF FORUM-SELECTION CLAUSE
ENFORCEMENT
A. The Historical Development of Forum-Selection Clauses
Within Federal Civil Procedure
Forum-selection clauses traditionally were viewed with disfavor by
the judiciary. Judicial suspicion may have arisen in part because a pri-
vate contractual agreement to litigate in a certain forum, made in ad-
vance of any dispute between the parties, cannot be limited to only one of
the four established procedural limitations imposed on courts: subject
matter jurisdiction,29 personal jurisdiction,30 venue3l and forum non con-
29 Subject matter jurisdiction is "at the top of the hierarchy" in "the limitations on the
courts' ability to resolve a lawsuit." Stein, supra note 7, at 786-87. It addresses the court's
"power" or "competency" in given "types" of lawsuits. Parties cannot create subject matter
jurisdiction by agreement and thus cannot waive a subject matter jurisdiction objection. See
Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1960).
30 Personal jurisdiction limits the territorial reach of the court; it protects defendants by
narrowing the number of courts with subject matter jurisdiction in which a defendant is sub-
ject to suit. See note 3 supra. Personal jurisdiction requirements call for a significant connec-
tion between a defendant and the forum. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945). A party can waive a personal jurisdiction objection. See Leroy v. Great W.
United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979) ("neither personal jurisdiction nor venue is fundamen-
tally preliminary in the sense that subject matter jurisdiction is, for both are personal privileges
of the defendant, rather than absolute strictures on the court, and both may be waived by the
parties").
31 Venue is the appropriate geographical location for trial within a single jurisdiction. See
15 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3801, at 3 (2d ed. 1986)
("'Venue' refers to locality, the place where a lawsuit should be heard."); Covey & Morris,
supra note 10, at 841 n.22 ("Jurisdiction is the power and authority of a court to hear and
determine a judicial proceeding. Venue is the geographical area in which a court with jurisdic-
tion may hear and determine a case.") (citing Black's Law Dictionary 766, 1396 (5th ed.
1979)); see also Hoffman, 363 U.S. at 351 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting in companion case Sulli-
van v. Behimer) ("[S]tatutory venue rules governing the place of trial do not affect the power
of a federal court to entertain an action, or of the plaintiff to bring it, but only afford the
defendant a privilege to object to the place chosen ....").
Until 1990, where federal subject matter jurisdiction was founded only on diversity of
citizenship, venue was proper "in the judicial district where all plaintiffs or all defendants
reside, or in which the claim arose." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1988). The Judicial Improvements
Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990), has expanded venue in the federal courts.
Among other things, the Act amended § 1391(a) to read:
A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship may, ex-
cept as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in (1) a judicial district where any
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veniens. 32 Forum-selection clauses pose a characterization problem33
since such clauses may waive a party's personal jurisdiction objection,34
waive access to certain courts with subject matter jurisdiction,35 specify a
particular venue within a court system,36 or offer a reason relevant to
forum non conveniens analysis to favor the contractual forum over other
possible forums.37
The terminology used to describe forum-selection clauses is impor-
tant because it may affect the analysis of enforceability.38 Historically,
almost all American courts treated forum-selection clauses as unenforce-
able39 attempts to "oust [their] jurisdiction." 40 However, this categoriza-
defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same state (2) a judicial district in which
a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a
substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is situated or (3) a judi-
cial district in which the defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the
action is commenced.
Id.
32 See Stein, supra note 7, at 786. Forum non conveniens is a judicial doctrine that allows
a court to dismiss a case where there is a more convenient forum elsewhere, although the
original forum may hear the dispute properly. See note 121 and accompanying text infra.
33 See Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual Adjudi-
catory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 Fordhamn L. Rev. 291, 322-31 (1988) (discussing, but
not resolving, category in which forum-selection clauses belong).
34 See J. Friedenthal, M. Kane & A. Miller, Civil Procedure § 3.5, at 104 (1985). In fact,
non-exclusive forum-selection clauses often are referred to as "consent to jurisdiction" clauses.
See note 10 supra.
35 See Gruson, supra note 2, at 156 ('If the parties to an agreement stipulate that the
courts of a specified foreign country shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all disputes, they
intend to exclude the jurisdiction of all other foreign courts and of all United States federal and
state courts that otherwise have personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the parties and
claims in dispute.").
36 See id. at 157 ("If suit is brought on the basis of diversity jurisdiction in a federal district
court other than the contractual federal district court, and the federal court is asked to dismiss
or transfer the case to the federal district court which the parties intended to have exclusive
jurisdiction, the federal court is faced with an issue of 'venue' rather than jurisdiction.").
37 See Royal Bed & Spring Co. v. Famossul Indus., 906 F.2d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 1990) (relying
on forum-selection clause as evidence of alternative forum for action in affirming district
court's dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds); cf. Gruson, supra note 2, at 142 n.28
("[S]ome decisions make a distinction between passing on the reasonableness of a forum-selec-
tion clause and the exercise of discretion under the doctrine offorum non conveniens; however,
the factors to be considered in deciding both motions are the same.").
38 See Gruson, supra note 2, at 157-58 (noting that terming forum-selection clauses "juris-
dictional" may affect analysis of their enforceability and that labeling them questions of
"venue" may bias Erie question); cf. Stein, supra note 7, at 786-87 ("A particular doctrine's
position in the hierarchy will determine when and whether a party can raise the limitation as
an objection to the proceeding, the degree of appellate scrutiny over the trial court's ruling, the
res judicata effect of the judgment, and, in certain cases, even the degree of constitutional
scrutiny over the decision." (footnotes omitted)).
39 See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972) ("Foram-selection clauses
have historically not been favored by American courts."). One commentator referred to the
"few cases in the United States... enforc[ing]" forum-selection clauses as "stand[ing] alone,
separate and apart." Comment, Agreements in Advance Conferring Exclusive Jurisdiction on
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
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tion is fallacious: forum-selection clauses cannot limit the subject matter
jurisdiction of courts, 41 since private parties have no power to abrogate
statutorily conferred jurisdiction.42
The Supreme Court finally recognized this fallacy, at least in the
context of international commerce, in its 1972 decision in The Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co.43 In The Bremen, the plaintiff, Zapata, contracted
with the defendant, owner of The Bremen, to transport its oil rig from
Louisiana to Italy.44 When the rig was damaged in a storm, Zapata com-
menced an admiralty suit in Florida, in violation of a contractual clause
requiring all disputes to be litigated in London.45 The defendant moved
to dismiss based on the forum-selection clause, but the Florida court held
that the clause, as an attempt to "oust" its jurisdiction, was against pub-
lie policy and thus unenforceable.46 The court of appeals affirmed. 47 De-
Foreign Courts, 10 La. L. Rev. 293, 297 (1950).
40 Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874) (dictum) ("agreements in
advance to oust the courts of the jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and void"), super-
seded by statute as stated in Graham v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 565 A.2d 908, 910-11 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1989); see also Nashua River Paper Co. v. Hammermill Paper Co., 223 Mass. 8, 19,
111 N.E. 678, 681 (1916) ("The same rule [of ouster] prevails generally in all States where the
question has arisen."); Benson v. Eastern Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 174 N.Y. 83, 86, 66 N.E. 627,
628 (1903) ("[Nothing is better settled than that agreements of this character are void.");
Juenger, supra note 9, at 51 ("United States courts have... frequently refused to dismiss
actions brought in violation of [forum-selection] clauses on the ground that a private contract
cannot take away jurisdiction from a court.").
"The origins of the ouster doctrine are shrouded in history." Id. One hypothesis is that
early judges, who were paid by the case, were reluctant to relinquish cases for pecuniary rea-
sons. See id.; Reese, The Contractual Forum: Situation in the United States, 13 Am. J. Comp.
L. 187, 189 (1964). Another explanation is that the rejection of forum-selection clauses grew
out ofjudges' rejection of arbitration clauses. See A. Ehrenzweig, A Treatise on the Conflict of
Laws § 41, at 148 (1962). A third explanation attributes the spreading of the ouster doctrine
to the power of language: "Perhaps the true explanation is the hypnotic power of the phrase
'oust the jurisdiction.' Give a bad dogma a good name and its bite may become as bad as its
bark." Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 984 (2d Cir. 1942)
(footnote omitted); Juenger, supra note 9, at 52 (noting that courts were "[i]mpressed with the
epithet 'ouster' ").
41 Although litigants may waive objections to lack of personal jurisdiction or lack of venue,
they cannot consent to subject matter jurisdiction where there is none, nor may they abrogate
subject matter jurisdiction where it exists by statute. See note 29 supra. The phrase "oust the
jurisdiction of the court" is thus a misnomer. Perhaps the best way to understand forum-
selection clauses is as a request that the court exercise its discretion to decline to hear the case
where there is a more appropriate forum elsewhere, a request resembling the invocation of
forum non conveniens. See Gruson, supra note 2, at 140; Annotation, Validity of Contractual
Provision Limiting Place or Court in which Action May be Brought, 31 A.L.RL 4th 404, 409
(1990).
42 See note 29 supra.
43 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
44 Id. at 2.
45 Id. at 3-4.
46 Id. at 4, 6.
47 Id. at 7.
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fendant appealed to the Supreme Court. Calling the ouster doctrine a
"vestigial legal fiction,"' 48 the Court enforced the contract's exclusive fo-
rum-selection clause providing for trial in London, even in the absence of
any relationship between the transaction and England, to respect "the
legitimate expectations of the parties, manifested in their freely negoti-
ated agreement." 49 The Court then concluded that forum-selection
clauses are "prima facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement
is shown by the resisting party to be 'unreasonable' under the circum-
stances.... A freely negotiated private international agreement, unaf-
fected by fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power...
should be given full effect." 50 The Court noted that "the elimination of
... uncertainties by agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable to both
parties is an indispensable element in international trade, commerce, and
contracting.
'51
The Bremen was decided in admiralty jurisdiction52 and thus is not
binding in other areas of federal common law.53 It also is possible to
48 Id. at 12.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 10-13 (footnotes omitted).
51 Id. at 13-14; see also Covey & Morris, supra note 10, at 838-39 (discussing The Bremen
Court's analysis of the enforceability of forum-selection clauses). In another international
case, the Court added that dispute-resolution clauses are "almost indispensible" for orderly
and predictable international business transactions. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417
U.S. 506, 516 (1974).
52 See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 3.
53 See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 28 (1988) (although The Bremen
may be "instructive," it does not bind federal court sitting in diversity); 19 C. Wright, A.
Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 4514, at 256-59 (2d ed. 1982) (uniform
body of substantive maritime law applicable to matters within admiralty and maritime juris-
diction).
Federal courts have original jurisdiction over admiralty claims under the Constitution.
See U.S. Const. art. HI, § 2, cl. 1. The Supreme Court has interpreted this constitutional grant
of power as authorizing the creation of federal common law in the admiralty area. See South-
ern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). Since the federal courts do not have authority to
fashion general federal common law, see note 157 and accompanying text infra, The Bremen, a
decision based on admiralty, cannot be binding in federal cases in which jurisdiction is based
on diversity of citizenship. Nonetheless, this Note argues that the Bremen principles, applied
correctly, represent the best test for enforcement of forum-selection clauses generally. Accord-
ingly, Congress should enact a federal statute incorporating the Bremen standard of enforce-
ment of forum-selection clauses. See note 78 infra. But see text accompanying notes 236-44
infra (under present law, Erie analysis dictates application of state law).
Because the Bremen Court used both restrictive and more general language, see note 56
infra, commentators have differed on whether the Bremen's reasoning was intended to apply
outside the admiralty area. Compare Gruson, supra note 2, at 149 n.58 ("By stating that the
decision in Bremen should be read in conjunction with National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v.
Szukent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964), the Supreme Court implied that the teaching of Bremen should
not be limited to admiralty law.") with Nadelmann, Choice-of-Court Clauses in the United
States: The Road to Zapata, 21 Am. J. Comp. L. 124, 135 (1973) (The Bremen Court intended
reasonableness test to be limited to admiralty cases).
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read the decision as limited to cases involving international agreements.A#
However, courts have not hesitated to extend the principles articulated in
The Bremen to the domestic, 55 nonadmiralty context.5 6 Application of
the Bremen principles to domestic cases is sensible insofar as these cases
implicate the ends The Bremen sought to serve-respecting freedom of
contract by upholding freely bargained-for agreements, 57 limiting pretrial
struggles over where to litigate,58 and honoring the expectations of the
parties.59
For this reason, the application of The Bremen to domestic forum-
selection clause disputes aired in federal courts sitting in diversity was,
for a time, uncontroversial. Indeed, The Bremen sparked an overreac-
tion, resulting in excessive enforcement of forum-selection clauses.60
4 See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12-13 (There are compelling reasons why a freely negoti-
ated private international agreement ... should be given full effect." (emphasis added)). A
Supreme Court decision following The Bremen that gave dispute-resolution clauses similarly
favorable treatment was also an international, though not an admiralty, case. See Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974).
55 Since courts generally do not distinguish between international and interstate agree-
ments in their analyses of forum-selection clauses, see Grusan, supra note 2, at 137 n.ll, many
courts have applied The Bremen to purely domestic, nonadmiralty disputes. See, e.g., Pelle-
port Investors v. Budco Quality Theatres, 741 F.2d 273, 279 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[W]e see no
reason why the principles announced in Bremen are not equally applicable to the domestic
context. Courts addressing the issue uniformly apply Bremen to cases involving domestic fo-
rum selection questions.").
56 See, e.g., Bense v. Interstate Battery Sys. of Am., 683 F.2d 718, 721 (2d Cir. 1982)
(argument that The Bremen only applies to cases brought under federal admiralty jurisdiction
"lacks merit"); In re Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 588 F.2d 93, 95 (5th Cir. 1979) ("While The
Bremen dealt with admiralty matters, its teaching is appropriate in the instant case.").
Courts may have felt justified in applying The Bremen outside of admiralty jurisdiction
because the Bremen Court itself relied on nonadmiralty cases in reaching its decision. Juenger,
supra note 9, at 59; see The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10 & n. 11. In addition, the Court followed its
restrictive statements with more general language, providing support for the argument that the
Court's holding extends to federal diversity cases. See id at 10-11 (prima facie validity of
forum-selection clauses "is merely the other side of the proposition... that in federl courts a
party may validly consent to be sued in a jurisdiction where he cannot be found for service of
process through contractual designation of an 'agent' for receipt of process in that jurisdic-
tion"). However, courts that apply The Bremen in diversity cases stumble into Erie questions.
For a discussion of the issues that may arise, see text accompanying notes 149-233 infra.
57 See notes 13-14 and accompanying text supra.
58 See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
59 See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
60 The Court itself helped spur the overreaction, finding that a clause would remain en-
forceable despite proof of fraud in the contracting process unless that fraud related directly to
the inclusion of the forum-selection clause itself in the agreement. See Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 n.14 (1974). Perhaps a more reasonable rule would find a
forum-selection clause vitiated by evidence of fraud in the contracting process so substantial as
to support the assumption that, but for the fraud, a party would never have entered into the
contract containing the forum-selection clause in the first place. See Hoffman v. Minuteman
Press Int'l, 747 F. Supp. 552, 559 (W.D. Mo. 1990) (applying this rule to deny § 1404(a)
motion to transfer to contractual forum).
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Compensating for the historical aversion to forum-selection clauses,61
lower federal courts began to enforce them almost reflexly, ignoring the
Bremen Court's instruction not to enforce clauses resulting from fraud,
undue influence, overweening bargaining power,62 or that are otherwise
unreasonable. 63 It is difficult to find a case in which a court applied the
Bremen test prior to its modification in Stewart Organization, Inc. v.
Ricoh Corp. 64 and refused to enforce a forum-selection clause.65 By shift-
ing dramatically in the 1970s and 1980s from routinely disregarding fo-
rum-selection clauses to enforcing them willy-nilly without a rulebook
"Zapata" motion,6 6 the federal courts set the stage for a procedural tan-
gle and, ultimately, a confusing retreat from the Bremen standard.
B. Pick a Motion, Any Motion
When a party to a contract with a forum-selection clause is haled
into court in a forum other than the one specified, her attorney must
decide whether and how to attempt enforcement of the forum-selection
61 See notes 39-40 and accompanying text supra.
62 For an example of a forum-selection clause that a court properly refused to enforce, see
Chasser v. Achille Lauro Lines, 844 F.2d 50, 51 (2d Cir. 1988), dismissing appeal from Kling-
hoffer v. Achille Lauro, 1988 A.M.C. 636 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd sub nom. Lauro Lines S.R.L.
v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495 (1989). In Chasser, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
denied interlocutory review of the district court's refusal to enforce a forum-selection clause
appearing "in tiny type" on a passenger ticket. But see Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 111 S.
Ct. 1522 (1991) (applying The Bremen, in admiralty case, to uphold forum-selection clause on
passenger ticket); Hodes v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro ed Altri-Gestione, 853 F.2d 905, 915-16 (3d
Cir. 1988). In Hodes, another case arising out of the Achille Lauro hijacking, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit examined presumably the same forum-selection clause appearing
on a passenger ticket and found that the clause, although in small print, was enforceable under
the Bremen standard. See id.
63 See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972). Even where there is no
evidence of fraud or the like in the bargaining process, "the enforcement of [a forum-selection]
clause is not an absolute right." Covey & Morris, supra note 10, at 842. Occasionally a con-
tractual dispute arises that was not foreseeable by the parties at the time of their agreement
and that might be better heard in a forum other than the contractual one. One party may
nevertheless attempt to enforce the clause, perhaps only because she feels that her opponent
would suffer the greater disadvantage of retaining the contractual forum. Similarly, although
an agreed-upon forum might have been the most convenient at the time of contracting,
changed circumstances might render another forum more logical and appropriate. For exam-
ple, a permissive forum-selection clause favoring Iran was not enforced where, after the Is-
lamic revolution, the Iranian legal system had undergone unanticipated radical changes. See
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 591 F. Supp. 293, 302-08 (E.D. Mo.
1984), aft'd, 758 F.2d 341 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948 (1985).
64 487 U.S. 22 (1988); see text accompanying note 215 infra.
65 See Note, Forum Selection Clauses: Substantive or Procedural for Erie Purposes, 89
Colum. L. Rev. 1068, 1083 (1989). Perhaps the sole instances where such clauses were not
enforced despite application of The Bremen are cases in which the forum-selection clause ap-
peared in small print on a passenger ticket. See Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 897 F.2d 377,
(9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, II1 S. Ct. 1522 (1991); Chasser, 844 F.2d at 51-52.
66 See note 26 supra; note 78 and accompanying text infra.
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clause. If the defendant wishes to see the clause enforced, she must make
a motion in the noncontractual forum for dismissal or transfer based on
the clause. Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the com-
mon law presently provide for a "Zapata" motion,67 a motion expressly
designed for forum-selection clause enforcement. Therefore, defense at-
torneys have had to invoke an assortment of rules and concepts that were
not designed with forum-selection clauses in mind.68 For example, they
have moved to transfer cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), 69 to dismiss or
transfer cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a),70 to dismiss cases under the
common-law doctrine of forum non conveniens, 71 and to dismiss cases
67 See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
68 One commentator put it aptly: "Attorneys seeking enforcement of a forum provision
typically invoke an array of procedural remedies and defenses in the hope that one is appropri-
ate to the court's view of the case. This makes for interesting lawyering and bad law." Mul-
lenix, supra note 33, at 327.
69 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988) provides: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in
the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought."
70 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1988) provides: 'The district court of a district in which is filed a
case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of
justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought."
Motions under § 1404(a) and § 1406(a) may be made separately, together, or in combina-
tion with other motions. See, e.g., In re Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos., 588 F.2d 93, 94 (5th Cir.
1979) (mandamus action seeking recall of district court's § 1404(a) transfer order); Moretti &
Perlow Law Offices v. Aleet Assocs., 668 F. Supp. 103, 104 (D.R.I. 1987) (defendant made
motion to dismiss under five Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or in the alternative to transfer
case under § 1406(a), which was granted); D'Antuono v. CCH Computax Sys., 570 F. Supp.
708, 709 (D.R.I. 1983) (transfer motion failed to specify transfer statute invoked, court treated
as based on both §§ 1404(a) and 1406(a)); Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Broetie, 545 F. Supp. 362,
364 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (general motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b), or, in the alternative, to
transfer under § 1404(a)); Cutter v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 510 F. Supp. 905, 906 (E.D. Wis.
1981) (combination motion to transfer or dismiss under both statutes); Wellmore Coal Corp. v.
Gates Learjet Corp., 475 F. Supp. 1140, 1141 (W.D. Va. 1979) (motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b), or in the alternative, to transfer under § 1406(a)); Taylor v. Titan Midwest Constr.
Corp., 474 F. Supp. 145, 146 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b), or in
alternative to transfer, court did not specify under which statute transfer is sought); Full-Sight
Lens Corp. v. Soft Lenses, 466 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (section 1404(a) or 1406(a) trans-
fer sought); National Equip. Rental v. Sanders, 271 F. Supp. 756, 760 (E.D.N.Y. 1967)
(same).
71 Forum non conveniens permits a court to decline jurisdiction where there is a more
appropriate forum elsewhere. See Sibaja v. Dow Chemical Co., 757 F.2d 1215, 1218 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 948 (1985). Forum non conveniens has been used to dismiss cases
from federal courts where there was a more convenient forum in a foreign country. It also has
been used occasionally where the more convenient forum was a state court. For a case grant-
ing a forum non conveniens motion based on a forum-selection clause, see Royal Bed & Spring
Co. v. Famossul Indus., 906 F.2d 45, 52-53 (1st Cir. 1990) (affirming dismissal on forum non
conveniens grounds so that action could be brought in forum specified in forum-selection
clause).
Generally the forum non conveniens motion is made in conjunction with another motion,
with the latter motion specifically intended to obtain forum-selection clause enforcement, see
note 124 and accompanying text infra, but a forum non conveniens motion also may be made
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
May 1991]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
under various Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 12(b)(1)
(lack of subject matter jurisdiction);72 Rule 12(b)(2) (lack of personal ju-
risdiction);73 Rule 12(b)(3) (improper venue);74 Rule 12(b)(6) (failure to
state a claim);75 and Rule 56 (summary judgment).7 6
The motions presently used for forum-selection clause enforcement
may be placed into four categories: (1) statutory transfer motions under
sections 1404(a) and 1406(a); (2) forum non conveniens dismissal mo-
tions; (3) motions to dismiss for lack of venue under Rule 12(b)(3); and
expressly to enforce the forum-selection clause, see Royal Bed, 906 F.2d at 52-53; note 124 and
accompanying text infra.
72 See Bryant Elec. Co. v. City of Fredericksburg, 762 F.2d 1192, 1196 (4th Cir. 1985)
(12(bX1) motion based on forum-selection clause alone); LFC Lessors v. Pacific Sewer Mainte-
nance Corp., 739 F.2d 4, 7 (1st Cir. 1984) (motions made under Rules 12(bXl) and 12(bX3),
but court held that 12(b)X6) would be proper motion); International Ass'n of Bridge Workers
Local Union 348 v. Koski Constr. Co., 474 F. Supp. 370, 371 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (motion for
remand premised on Rule 120)Xl)).
73 See Richardson Greenshields Sec. v. Metz, 566 F. Supp. 131, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (mo-
tion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)X2), or in the alternative, to transfer under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a)).
74 See Bense v. Interstate Battery Sys. of Am., 683 F.2d 718, 719 (2d Cir. 1982) (12(bX3)
motion brought alone); Cutter v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 510 F. Supp. 905, 906 (E.D. Wis. 1981)
(12(b)(3) motion joined with motion to transfer under § 1406(a)); Paterson, Zochonis U.K.
Ltd. v. Compania United Arrows, S.A., 493 F. Supp. 626, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (general objec-
tion to jurisdiction and venue based on forum-selection clause); Wellmore Coal Corp. v. Gates,
475 F. Supp. 1140, 1141 (W.D. Va. 1979) (general 12(b) objection to venue personal jurisdic-
tion, and subject matter jurisdiction joined with motion to transfer under § 1406(a)).
75 See, e.g., Instrumentation Assoc. v. Madsen Elec., 859 F.2d 4, 6 n.4 (3d Cir. 1988)
(motion to dismiss premised only on 12(bX6)); LFC Lessors, 739 F.2d at 7 (finding proper
motion was not 12(b)X1) or 12(bX3), but 12(bX6)); Central Contracting Co. v. Maryland Casu-
alty Co., 367 F.2d 341, 343 (3d Cir. 1966) (treating 12(bX6) motion as Rule 56 summary
judgment motion because supporting affidavits filed by both parties); American Performance
Corp. v. Sanford, 749 F. Supp. 1094, 1094 n.1 (M.D. Ala. 1990) (finding that forum-selection
clause did not deprive court of jurisdiction or venue but rather warranted dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6)); Page Constr. Co. v. Perini Constr., 712 F. Supp. 9, 11 (D.R.I. 1989) (motions to
dismiss under 12(b)(6) and § 1406(a) analyzed under § 1404(a); court did not reach issue of
whether violation of forum-selection clause sufficient for 12(bX6) dismissal).
76 See General Eng'g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, 783 F.2d 352 (3d Cir. 1986);
Moretti & Perlow Law Offices v. Aleet Assocs., 668 F. Supp. 103, 104 (D.R.I. 1987) (defen-
dant filed motions to dismiss under numerous provisions, including Rules 12(bX2), 12(b)(3),
12(b)(6), 17, and 56). In still other cases, defendants have moved to remand cases removed to
federal court in contravention of a provision requiring a state forum. See, e.g., Hunt Wesson
Foods v. Supreme Oil Co., 817 F.2d 75, 76 (9th Cir. 1987); Transure v. Marsh & McLennan,
766 F.2d 1297, 1299 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985); Pelleport Investors v. Budco Quality Theatres, 741
F.2d 273, 275 (9th Cir. 1984); Intermountain Sys. v. Edsall Constr. Co., 575 F. Supp. 1195,
1197 (D. Colo. 1983); City of New York v. Pullman Inc., 477 F. Supp. 438,440-41 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); Public Water Supply Dist. No. I v. American Ins. Co., 471 F. Supp. 1071, 1071 (W.D.
Mo. 1979). The latter cases are in a different procedural posture than the cases relevant to this
Note, as they involve attempts to enforce a forum-selection clause that excludes federal fo-
rums, limiting the parties to a particular state forum. Since this Note addresses forum-selec-
tion clause enforcement within the federal system, it does not examine these state forum-
selection clauses further. For a discussion of the issues raised by forum-selection clauses in
this procedural posture, see Mullenix, supra note 33, at 339-46.
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(4) dismissal motions premised on other Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. The remainder of this Part discusses forum-selection clause en-
forcement under each of these motions and points out the problems
associated with their use. This discussion will show that the use of make-
shift motions for the enforcement of forum-selection clauses is fraught
with problems, particularly where the policies behind forum-selection
clauses are not coextensive with those of the mechanisms used to seek
enforcement.77 A rulebook "Zapata" motion, based on a uniform body
of federal law on forum-selection clauses, would eliminate many of these
difficulties.78
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides: "For the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil
action to any other district or division where it might have been
brought. ' 79 Transfer under section 1404(a) is predicated on proper juris-
diction and venue in the transferor court8° and the availability of another
federal court8 l in which the suit could have been brought originally.82
This restriction reinforces the statutes that limit available forums by
preventing parties from using the transfer mechanism to obtain access to
a federal court from which they otherwise would have been barred.8 3
77 See text accompanying notes 79-145 infra.
78 Ideally, Congress would pass a statute requiring forum-selection clause enforcement in
the federal courts. The statute would codify a standard similar to that expressed in The
Bremen. Such a statute might read: "Contractual agreements between private parties to liti-
gate in one forum to the exclusion of all others will be honored in the federal courts to the
extent that they do not result from fraud, undue influence, overweening bargaining power, or
are otherwise unreasonable." A motion to enforce the statute could be included in Rule 12()
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and would simply be a motion to dismiss to honor an
exclusive forum-selection clause. The combination of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and a
federal statutory standard would allow development of a body of law tailored to forum-selec-
tion clause enforcement.
79 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988).
80 Where venue or personal jurisdiction is defective, the proper transfer mechanism is 28
U.S.C. § 1406(a). See notes 104-05 and accompanying text infra.
81 See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Where the alternative forum is not another federal court, the
common-law doctrine of forum non conveniens may be invoked. See note 32 and accompany-
ing text supra.
It sometimes is stated that § 1404(a) is the statutory codification of forum non conveniens.
In fact, the transfer mechanism had been proposed several years before Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), approved the use of forum non conveniens in the federal courts.
See id. at 512; Stein, supra note 7, at 807; see also Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32
(1955) (section 1404(a) is not a codification of forum non conveniens and thus does not require
as strong a showing of inconvenience).
82 See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
83 However, this reasoning does not apply in certain instances. Since an objection to venue
is waivable, and a valid forum-selection clause can serve as an agreement to waive a venue
objection, see note 10 supra, it is possible that the parties would have had access, as an original
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The section 1404(a) transfer mechanism, often employed outside the
forum-selection clause context, is also a popular way to seek forum-selec-
tion clause enforcement.8 4 In addition, use of section 1404(a) in the fo-
rum-selection clause context recently garnered attention when the
Supreme Court held in Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. 8 5 that
section 1404(a) analysis controls a decision whether to transfer a case to
the contractual forum. 8 6
Despite this endorsement by the Supreme Court, the use of a section
1404(a) transfer to enforce a forum-selection clause may carry two signif-
icant disadvantages for defendants. First, in a section 1404(a) analysis, a
forum-selection clause is but one of a myriad of factors a court may con-
sider in determining whether "the convenience of parties and witnesses"
and "the interest of justice" 87 favor transfer.8 8 While the clause usually
matter, to a court from which they are barred under the statute. The explanation for this
apparent anomoly is that courts have interpreted the "might have been brought" language of
§ 1404(a) to mean a forum for which the statutory venue requirements actually are met, not
waived. See Heller Fin. v. Shop-A-Lot, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 292, 295 (N.D. IMI. 1988) (section
1404(a) transfer motion denied since "Heller could not have brought this action in Louisiana
because not all of the defendants reside there.").
84 See C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts § 44, at 164 (2d ed. 1983) ("[N]o issue of civil
procedure gives rise to so many reported decisions, year after year, as does this seemingly
simple statute."). Parties may make a § 1404(a) transfer motion either to attempt enforcement
of a forum-selection clause, see, e.g., Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1071
(11th Cir. 1987) (directing district court to grant motion to transfer case to New York to
honor forum-selection clause), aff'd, 487 U.S. 22 (1988); Full-Sight Contact Lens Corp. v. Soft
Lenses, 466 F. Supp. 71, 72-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (defendant moved to dismiss under 12(bX3)
and § 1406, or, in the alternative, to transfer under § 1404), or to try to move the case out of
the contractual forum, see, e.g., Plum Tree, Inc. v. Stockment, 488 F.2d 754, 757 (3d Cir.
1973) (dictum) ("we note that the existence of a valid forum-selection clause whose enforce-
ment is not unreasonable does not necessarily prevent the selected forum from ordering a
transfer of the case under § 1404(a)" (footnotes omitted)); Savin v. C.S.X. Corp., 657 F. Supp.
1210, 1214-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (case transferred to Pennsylvania despite New York forum-
selection clause); Credit Alliance Corp. v. Crook, 567 F. Supp. 1462, 1464 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(transferred from contractual forum to California); Coface v. Optique Du Monde, 521 F.
Supp. 500, 505-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (transferred from contractual forum to Illinois). This Note
concerns itself solely with motions seeking enforcement of forum-selection clauses.
85 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
86 See id. at 23; text accompanying notes 185-91 infra.
87 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); cf. New Medico Assocs. v. Kleinhenz, 750 F. Supp. 1145, 1146 (D.
Mass. 1990) (" 'The interest of justice' is a resounding phrase of celestial vacuity.").
88 See, e.g., Houk v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 613 F. Supp. 923, 928-32 (W.D. Mo. 1985)
(grouping factors under seven headings: "Convenience of Witnesses," "Convenience of Par-
ties," "Availability of Judicial Process," "Avoidance of Multiple Litigation," "Application of
Foreign Law," "Cost Effectiveness and Ease of Access to Sources of Proof," and "Congestion
of Court's Calendar"); Y4 Design v. Regensteiner Publishing Enters., 428 F. Supp. 1067, 1068-
69 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (factors relevant on motion to transfer include "the convenience to parties;
the relative ease of access to sources of proof, the availability of process to compel attendance
of unwilling witnesses; the cost of obtaining willing witnesses; practical problems that make
trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive; and the interests of justice"); see also Vassallo
v. Niedermeyer, 495 F. Supp. 757, 759 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (invoking Y4's six-factor test and
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is considered in the evaluation of the parties' convenience since it is pre-
sumed that their agreement took convenience into account, 89 it is unclear
whether the forum-selection clause is relevant to any of the other section
1404(a) elements.90 Thus, in weighing the factors considered relevant
under section 1404(a), a court may refuse to enforce a contractual provi-
sion, not because it is defective in substance, but merely because other
factors "outweigh" its enforcement.91 This possibility in effect enables a
court to override an otherwise valid contractual provision as a "proce-
adding plaintiff's choice of forum as factor).
89 See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 29 ("the District Court will be called on to address such issues
as the convenience of a Manhattan forum given the parties' expressed preference for that
venue'); Plum Tree, Inc. v. Stockment, 488 F.2d 754, 758 (3d Cir. 1973) (convenience factor is
within power of private parties to indicate in forum-selection clause); New Medico Assoc., 750
F. Supp. at 1145-46 (on motion to transfer out of contractual forum, forum-selection clause
operates as waiver of moving party's objection on grounds of inconvenience); TUC Elec. v.
Eagle Telephonics, 698 F. Supp. 35, 39 (D. Conn. 1988) (contract designation conclusive on
convenience question); Savin v. C.S.X. Corp., 657 F. Supp. 1210, 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(same).
90 The Supreme Court's most recent words on this question are somewhat opaque:
In its resolution of the § 1404 motion in this case, for example, the District Court will be
called on to address such issues as the convenience of a Manhattan forum in light of the
parties' expressed preference for that venue, and the fairness of transfer in light of the
forum selection clause and the parties' relative bargaining power.
Stewart, 487 U.S. at 29. The general rule seems to be that the forum-selection clause may
affect only the "convenience of the parties" factor. See, e.g., Heller Fin. v. Midwhey Powder
Co., 883 F.2d 1286, 1293 (7th Cir. 1989) (only "convenience of the parties" factor is within
parties' power to waive); Red Bull Assoc. v. Best W. Int'l, 862 F.2d 963, 967 (2d Cir. 1988)
("interest of justice" factor not within control of parties); Full-Sight Contact Lens Corp. v.
Soft Lenses, 466 F. Supp. 71, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (only evaluation of convenience of parties is
affected by forum-selection clause).
One of the first courts to address this issue seemed ambivalent. It first appeared to en-
dorse the general rule above, stating:
Congress set down in § 1404(a) the factors it thought should be decisive on a motion for
transfer. Only one of these---the convenience of the parties-is properly within the
power of the parties themselves to affect by a forum-selection clause. The other fac-
tors-the convenience of witnesses and the interest of justice-are third party or public
interests that must be weighed by the district court; they cannot be automatically out-
weighed by the existence of a purely private agreement of the parties.
Plum Tree, Inc., 488 F.2d at 757-58. However, in a later footnote the court retreated from
certainty, stating:
A valid forum-selection agreement may be treated as a waiver by the moving party of its
right to assert its own convenience as a factor in favoring transfer from the agreed upon
forum or as one element to be considered in weighing the interest of justice. Whether
the forum-selection agreement should be treated in either or both of these ways will
often depend on its specific terms.
Id. at 758 n.7. This approach generally has not been followed.
91 See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 23 ('The forum-selection clause, which represents the parties'
agreement as to the most proper forum, should receive neither dispositive consideration...
nor no consideration ...but rather the consideration for which Congress provided in
§ 1404(a)."); cf. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys. v. Youngblood, 359 F. Supp. 1125, 1129 (W.D.
Ark. 1973) ("The plaintiff's choice of the forum should rarely be disturbed.")
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dural" matter.92 In fact, under Stewart, district courts have almost un-
fettered discretion in deciding section 1404(a) motions based on forum-
selection clauses. Defendants accordingly have no way of predicting the
weight to be accorded these clauses. 93
A second question arising from the use of section 1404(a) for the
enforcement of forum-selection clauses is what substantive law to apply
once the transfer occurs. Under Van Dusen v. Barrack,94 a section
1404(a) transfer carries with it the law that would have been applied by
the transferor forum.9 5 The rationale for the Van Dusen rule is that the
defendant should not be able to use a change of venue to obtain a differ-
ent law.96 This makes sense in the classic transfer case, where it is simply
judicial convenience that calls for litigation of the matter in a district
other than the one in which the case was brought. The rule, however,
poses problems where the section 1404(a) transfer is used to effect forum-
selection clause enforcement, because, in the forum-selection clause con-
text, a defendant successful in obtaining a 1404(a) transfer to enforce a
forum-selection clause nevertheless loses the benefit of the choice-of-law
of the contractual forum,97 since the transferee court will apply the law
that the original, noncontractual forum would have applied.98
Whatever the district court judge's decision on such a 1404(a) trans-
fer motion, it likely will escape appellate review entirely, both as a matter
92 In Stewart, the district court's decision not to enforce the forum-selection clause, on
remand from the Supreme Court, is indicative of the problem. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh
Corp., 696 F. Supp. 583, 590 (N.D. Ala. 1988) ("In this case, the other private factors [in the
§ 1404(a) inquiry] simply outweigh any weight to be given the private factor consisting of the
forum-selection clause, no matter how relatively important this factor might be."). The trans-
fer order ultimately was granted, however, as mandamus was issued by the Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit. See In re Ricoh Corp., 870 F.2d 570, 574 (11th Cir.), motion for stay
of mandamus denied, 713 F. Supp. 1419, 1419 (N.D. Ala. 1989).
93 See notes 217-25 and accompanying text infra.
94 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
95 Id. at 636 (parties not entitled to "change of law as a bonus for a change of venue"
(quoting Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 522 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting))).
96 Id. However, a recent Supreme Court case calls this rationale into doubt: the same rule
was held to apply to aplaintiff-initiatd transfer, which means that a plaintiff can bring suit in
an improper venue solely to obtain that forum's law and then can transfer the case to the
desired forum. See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 110 S. Ct. 1274, 1280-81 (1990).
97 Including a choice-of-law clause in the contract may prevent this problem if the trans-
feree court, applying the law that the transferor court would have applied, enforces the choice-
of-law clause. Since most states enforce reasonable choice-of-law clauses, see note 255 infra,
this precaution should protect most defendants. Of course, the problem is not avoided if the
transferee court, the contractual forum, would have enforced the choice-of-law clause had the
case been brought there as an original matter but refuses to enforce the choice-of-law clause
after determining that the transferor forum would not.
99 See Hoffman v. Burroughs Corp., 571 F. Supp. 545, 550-51 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (judge
considered whether to transfer case under § 1404(a) or § 1406(a) since transfer mechanism
would determine applicable law, including what choice-of-law rules would apply after
transfer).
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of interlocutory appeal and after final judgment. A section 1404(a) trans-
fer is an interlocutory order because it does not address the merits of the
underlying dispute, and as such it generally is not reviewable immedi-
ately.99 More important to defendants, if transfer is denied, review of
that order is rare °00 and, even if granted, is not worth much after an
99 See C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3855 (1978);
see also Sunshine Beauty Supplies v. United States Dist. Court, 872 F.2d 310, 311 (9th Cir.
1989) (stating that transfer order not final appealable order but granting mandamus to review);
Louisiana Ice Cream Distrib. v. Carvel Corp., 821 F.2d 1031, 1033 (5th Cir. 1987) (denying
interlocutory appellate review of 12(bX3) motion based on forum-selection clause because not
"collateral order" of trial court and because analogous denial of § 1404(a) transfer not imme-
diately reviewable); Southern Distrib. Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 718 F. Supp. 1264, 1268
(W.D.N.C. 1989) (stating that order granting or denying 1404(a) transfer motion is interlocu-
tory and ordinarily nonappealable).
100 If the § 1404(a) motion is based upon the forum-selection clause, interlocutory review of
a denial of a 12(bX3) motion to dismiss based on a forum-selection clause may be unavailable.
See Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 496 (1989). In most cases the grant or denial
of a § 1404(a) transfer motion is not reviewable prior to final judgment, as it is an interlocutory
order. See note 99 and accompanying text supra. In the overwhelming majority of § 1404(a)
transfer cases, § 1292(bX2) certification for interlocutory appeal would not be available be-
cause the requisite controlling question of law would be absent. See, e.g., Southern Distrib.
Co., 718 F. Supp. at 1268 n.2 (declining to certify for interlocutory appeal based on lack of
"'controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opin-
ion' (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1292(bX2))); note 182 infra. But see Red Bull Assocs. v. Best W.
Int'l, 862 F.2d 963, 965 n.4 (1988) ("Some commentators have questioned whether § 1404(a)
transfer motions are properly appealable under § 1292(b).... Where, however, it is urged that
the court considered improper factors in making its decision to transfer, review via § 1292(b) is
appropriate." (citations omitted)).
If transfer is granted, review may be unavailable even after final judgment, as many cir-
cuits follow the rule that a circuit court cannot review a decision of a district court in another
circuit, a rule derived from 28 U.S.C. § 2105 (1988): "There shall be no reversal in the
Supreme Court or a court of appeals for error in ruling upon matters in abatement which do
not involve jurisdiction." See, e.g., Hatch v. Reliance Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 409, 413 (9th Cir.)
(reconsideration by transferee court of removal and transfer inappropriate unless appellants
were denied full and fair opportunity to litigate), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1021 (1985); Roofing &
Sheet Metal Servs. v. La Quinta Motor Inns, 689 F.2d 982, 985-86 (1lth Cir. 1982) (refusing to
review merits of transfer order because court "lack[s] jurisdiction to review the decision of a
district court embraced by another circuit"); Technitrol v. McManus, 405 F.2d 84, 87 (8th Cir.
1968) (expressing "grave doubt" whether court had right to review transfer order issued by
district court of another circuit), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 997 (1969); Purex Corp. v. St. Louis
Nat'l Stockyards Co., 374 F.2d 998, 1000 (7th Cir.) (appropriate appellate court to review
transfer order is court of appeals for circuit in which transfer order was made and not court of
appeals for circuit of transferee court), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 824 (1967); Preston Corp. v.
Reese, 335 F.2d 827, 828 (4th Cir. 1964) (per curiam) (dictum) (same); cf. In re Corrugated
Container Anti-Trust Litig., 620 F.2d 1086, 1090-91 (5th Cir.) (order to appear for a deposi-
tion reviewable only in circuit embracing court that issued subpoena), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1102 (1980). But see Magnetic Eng'g & Mfg. Co. v. Dings Mfg. Co., 178 F.2d 866, 868-70 (2d
Cir. 1950) (court of appeals of circuit embracing transferee court may review transferor court's
order on appeal from final judgment).
If defendant's transfer motion is granted, the plaintiff may request permission of the dis-
trict court to certify a question of law regarding the grant of such a motion or, after transfer,
can move for retransfer in the transferee court and appeal a denial of retransfer to the trans-
feree appellate court. See Nascone v. Spudnuts, 735 F.2d 763, 765-67 (3d Cir. 1984). These
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entire trial has taken place in the wrong forum.101
In sum, the section 1404(a) transfer, although frequently used as a
means of enforcing forum-selection clauses, contains traps for the un-
wary. Under current law, in cases where federal jurisdiction is based on
diversity of citizenship, the forum-selection clause is only one of many
factors the court considers in deciding whether to transfer.10 2 Thus, a
perfectly valid clause may not be enforced if the district judge finds that
other convenience factors disfavoring transfer outweigh the clause. If the
case is transferred, the defendant may find that the law applied is not the
law that she expected, namely that which would have been applied had
suit been brought in the contractual forum as an original matter.10 3 Fi-
nally, whatever the judge's decision, it likely will be shielded from appel-
late review.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)
28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) provides: "The district court of a district in
which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall
dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any
district or division in which it could have been brought."10' 4 It is a cura-
tive provision that enables litigants to avoid dismissal for a defect in
venue that would not have arisen in at least one other federal court.1°5
Although the statute authorizes dismissal or transfer, it often is used for
transfer, as an alternative to section 1404(a) when venue is laid improp-
erly in the original forum.
Transfer of a case from one federal forum to another to honor a
maneuvers have little chance of success. However, at least in the Ninth Circuit, a party may
be able to obtain review of a grant of a transfer motion by mandamus. See Sunshine Beauty
Supplies, 872 F.2d at 311. But see Petition of Int'l Precious Metals Corp., 917 F.2d 792, 792
(4th Cir. 1990) (petition for mandamus to order district court to transfer case to enforce fo-
rum-selection clause denied because appeal after final judgment is adequate means of relief).
101 See Lauro Lines, 490 U.S. at 499 ("If it is eventually decided that the District Court
erred in allowing trial in this case to take place in New York, petitioner will have been put to
unnecessary trouble and expense, and the value of its contractual right to an Italian forum will
have been diminished."); Sunshine Beauty Supplies, 872 F.2d at 311 ("Although Sunshine
could appeal after final judgment .... the prejudice that results from an erroneous transfer
order is of a type not correctable on appeal.").
102 See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 29; text accompanying note 191 infra; note 88 and accompany-
ing text supra.
103 See notes 97-98 and accompanying text supra.
104 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1988).
105 Section 1406(a) can be used to cure a venue defect even where the transferor court lacks
personal jurisdiction over the defendant. See Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466
(1962) ('The language of 1406(a) is amply broad enough to authorize the transfer of cases,
however wrong the plaintiff may have been in filing his case as to venue, whether the court in
which it was filed has personal jurisdiction over the defendants or not.").
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forum-selection clause sometimes is effected under this section. 1°6 How-
ever, the fit is awkward. In the typical forum-selection clause case, the
parties are in a forum that satisfies the requirements of the federal venue
statutes but is not the contractual forum. Venue thus is not technically
"wrong." 10 7 Accordingly, section 1406(a) is not properly available to
most defendants seeking to enforce forum-selection clauses. Such clauses
cannot "oust" the venue created by statute anymore than they can oust
the jurisdiction of the courts.10 8
Nevertheless, courts have enforced forum-selection clauses under
section 1406(a) even where venue is proper, revealing the mistaken belief
that section 1406(a) can serve simply as an alternative to section 1404(a)
where suit is brought in contravention of a valid forum-selection
clause.109 Faced with a defendant's transfer motion based on a forum-
selection clause, some courts have viewed section 1406(a) as a legitimate
transfer mechanism for this purpose.110 Still others have avoided the
question by acting simultaneously under both sections 1404(a) and
1406(a), or acting without explicit reference to either.' The Supreme
Court noted the incorrect use of section 1406(a) in Stewart Organization,
106 See notes 109-10 infra.
107 See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 28 n.8 ("The parties do not dispute that the District Court
properly denied the motion to dismiss the case for improper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a)
because respondent apparently does business in the Northern District of Alabama. See 28
U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1988) (venue proper in judicial district in which corporation is doing
business).").
108 See notes 40-42 and accompanying text supra (discussing "ouster" doctrine).
109 See D'Antuono v. CCH Computax Sys., 570 F. Supp. 708, 710 (D.R.I. 1983) ("The
federal courts have hop-scotched between these sections in weighing the effect of forum selec-
tion covenants."); Hoffman v. Burroughs Corp., 571 F. Supp. 545, 550 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (not-
ing that courts have differed on this issue, some applying one statute, some the other, some
both, and one acting without reference to either one); see also Full-Sight Contact Lens Corp. v.
Soft Lenses, 466 F. Supp. 71, 72-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (comparing application of § 1406 to fo-
rum-selection clauses with application of § 1404(a)).
110 See, e.g., Moretti & Perlow Law Offices v. Aleet Assocs., 668 F. Supp. 103, 104-07
(D.RII. 1987) (defendant made transfer motion under five Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and § 1406(a) but only pursued its § 1406(a) motion, which court granted after articulating
federal common law theory based in part on existence of § 1406(a)); D'Antuono, 570 F. Supp.
at 710 (treating motion to transfer as resting on both §§ 1404(a) and 1406(a) and applying the
latter since court found venue "improper" due to forum-selection clause); Hoffman, 571 F.
Supp. at 550-51 (conscious preference by court for section 1406(a) based on choice-of-law
issue); Full-Sight Contact Lens Corp., 466 F. Supp. at 74 (finding § 1406(a) applicable because
venue "improper," but noting that same result would follow under § 1404(a)).
11 See, e.g., Kline v. Kawai Am. Corp., 498 F. Supp. 868, 873 n.5 (D. Minn. 1980) (acting
under both statutes); Taylor v. Titan Midwest Constr. Corp., 474 F. Supp. 145, 148-49 (N.D.
Tex. 1979) (acting without reference to either statute); Cruise v. Castleton, 449 F. Supp. 564,
571 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (acting under both statutes); see also D'Antuono, 570 F. Supp. at 711
n.4 ('Thus, although the initial judicial approach to a motion grounded upon a forum selec-
tion clause should, in this court's view, be by way of 1406(a), an instant replay, under 1404(a)
standards, may well take place if it is eventually found that the clause relied on cannot be
enforced.").
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Ina v. Ricoh Corp. 112 Some lower courts have interpreted Stewart to pre-
clude the use of section 1406(a) where venue is proper under the applica-
ble statute,113 but at least one federal district court applied that section to
a forum-selection clause after Stewart where venue was not held
improper.1 14
It has been argued that section 1406(a) should be available for trans-
fers to enforce forum-selection clauses to avoid the choice-of-law prob-
lem accompanying the use of section 1404(a). 115 The rationale for the
use of section 1406(a) in such cases is that a case not brought in the
contractual forum is in effect brought in the "wrong" venue.116 How-
ever, this is a misinterpretation of section 1406(a). The statute is a cura-
tive provision that applies only where "a case [is filed] laying venue in the
wrong division or district,"117 that is, where it fails to meet the require-
ments of the statutory venue provisions.' 18 Certainly for the defendant
112 See 487 U.S. 22, 28 n.8 (1988). The Court stated: "The parties do not dispute that the
District Court properly denied the motion to dismiss the case for improper venue under 28
U.S.C. § 1406(a) because respondent apparently does business in the Northern District of Ala-
bama." Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 139 1(c) (1988) (venue proper in judicial district where corporation
is doing business).
113 See, e.g., Crescent Int'l v. Avatar Communities, Inc., 857 F.2d 943, 944 n.1 (3d Cir.
1988) (motion to dismiss under Rule 12; court notes statement in Stewart that § 1406 does not
apply when venue is proper under § 1391); Southern Distrib. Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 718
F. Supp. 1264, 1267 (W.D.N.C. 1989) (noting that Stewart made clear that presence of forum-
selection clause does not in and of itself make venue improper; treating § 1406(a) motion as
having been raised under § 1404(a)); Page Constr. Co. v. Perini Constr. Co., 712 F. Supp. 9, 11
(D.R.I. 1989) (reading Stewart as finding that § 1406(a) transfer is inappropriate where venue
is proper, and treating motion under Rule 12(bX6) and § 1406(a) as a § 1404(a) transfer mo-
tion); TUC Elec. v. Eagle Telephonics, 698 F. Supp. 35, 38 n.3 (D. Conn. 1988) (noting Stew-
art Court's application of § 1404(a) and statement that District Court properly denied
§ 1406(a) motion as venue was not improper under § 1391(c)).
114 See L.A. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Texas E. Prods. Pipeline Co., 699 F. Supp. 185, 186-87
(S.D. Ind. 1988) (noting that Stewart held that federal law applied to § 1404(a) transfer mo-
tion, and holding that federal law similarly applies to § 1406(a) motion to enforce forum-
selection clause; court does not address question of whether venue is proper).
115 See Comment, supra note 2, at 1120-21; see also Hoffman v. Burroughs Corp., 571 F.
Supp. 545, 550-51 (N.D. Tex. 1982) (conscious preference by court for § 1406(a) for choice-of-
law reasons).
116 See Hoffman, 571 F. Supp. at 551 ("It is true that venue in the plaintiff's chosen court,
while contrary to the contractual agreement, may satisfy the legal requirements for venue of 28
U.S.C. 1391. However, the nature of a motion to enforce a forum selection clause is that venue
is wrong in the first instance .... "); D'Antuono v. CCH Computax Sys., 570 F. Supp. 708, 710
(D.R.I. 1983) (section 1406(a) applies to transfers based on forum-selection clauses since venue
in such cases is "wrong," not merely inconvenient).
117 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a).
118 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391-1403; see also Comment, supra note 6, at 1395-96 n.102 ("A
plain-meaning construction of section 1406(a) in pari materia with the general venue statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1391, leads to the conclusion that 'improper venue' refers only to venues where the
place of business or residence of the litigants is improper."). This interpretation of section
1406(a) is consistent with that of the Supreme Court in Stewart. See note 112 and accompany-
ing text supra.
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moving for forum-selection clause enforcement, a section 1406(a) trans-
fer is preferable to a section 1404(a) transfer because the applicable law
will be that of the contractual, transferee forum, rather than the law of
the improper forum selected by the plaintiff. Section 1404(a) is the logi-
cal alternative but it affords plaintiffs the potential for manipulation of
choice of law.' 19 The proper judicial response is not to allow either party
to use the inappropriate transfer mechanism, but rather for courts to ap-
ply section 1404(a) without retaining the transferor court's choice of law
after transfer.120
3. Forum Non Conveniens
Forum non conveniens is a common-law doctrine that allows a
judge to dismiss a case when there is a more convenient forum elsewhere,
even though jurisdiction and venue are laid properly in the original fo-
rum. The doctrine is similar in theory to the section 1404(a) transfer, but
while that section operates only within the federal system, forum non
conveniens may be used by federal courts to respect a more convenient
forum in a foreign country, or even in a state or territorial court.121 It is
thus an ideal motion for enforcement of a clause specifying a forum other
than another federal court.1 2 A motion to enforce a forum-selection
provision may be made directly under forum non conveniens, 123 or it
may be brought under a federal statutory provision and joined with a
119 See text accompanying notes 97-98 supra.
120 See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 636 (1964) (holding that § 1404(a) transfer
carries with it the law that transferor forum would have applied). The Van Dusen Court
reasoned that where a defendant obtains a transfer from one appropriate venue to another, she
should not get a choice-of-law bonus. See notes 95-96 and accompanying text supra. How-
ever, where plaintiff chose her venue in violation of a forum-selection clause, she should not
benefit by retaining the choice of law of that forum. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court is
unlikely to cut back on Van Dusen, as it recently applied the rule to a plaintiff-initiated trans-
fer, thus allowing a plaintiff to shop for choice of law and then obtain her forum of choice. See
Ferens v. John Deere Co., 110 S. Ct. 1274, 1280-81 (1990); note 96 supra.
121 See, e.g., Royal Bed & Spring Co. v. Famossul Indus., 906 F.2d 45, 51 (1st Cir. 1990)
(noting that, since forum-selection clause refers to forum outside United States, § 1404(a) does
not apply, but forum non conveniens may); Glicken v. Bradford, 204 F. Supp. 300, 304
(S.D.N.Y. 1962) (forum non conveniens is applicable only where action should have been
brought in a foreign country or in a state court).
122 In this scenario, forum-selection clause enforcement should not be affected by the
Supreme Court's decision in Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
See Note, Forum Selection Clauses Designating Foreign Courts: Does Federal or State Law
Govern Enforceability in Diversity Cases? A Question Left Open by Stewart Organization,
Ina v. Ricoh Corp., 22 Cornell Int'l LJ. 308, 310 (1989). The Stewart case, decided in the
§ 1404(a) context, is necessarily limited to cases where the contractual forum is another federal
court, since § 1404(a) is operative only within the federal system. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
(1988); note 81 and accompanying text supra.
123 See Royal Bed & Spring Co., 906 F.2d at 53 (affirming dismissal on forum non con-
veniens grounds so that action could be brought in forum specified in forum-selection clause,
which court found enforceable).
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forum non conveniens motion, either as an alternative reason for dismis-
sal, 124 or in the hope that the clause will be considered in deciding the
forum non conveniens motion if dismissal based solely on the forum-
selection clause is not granted.
In Gulf Oil v. Gilbert,125 the Supreme Court enumerated the factors
to be considered in deciding a forum non conveniens motion to dis-
miss. 1 26 The presence or absence of a forum-selection clause was not
mentioned in the long list of factors. In fact, the Gilbert Court stated
that, "[u]nless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plain-
tiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed." 127 This presumption
in favor of the plaintiff's chosen forum could render forum-selection
clause enforcement via forum non conveniens difficult. The appropriate-
ness of Gilbert's influence on forum-selection clause motions is questiona-
ble, however, since forum-selection clauses stood in disfavor at the time
of the Gilbert decision.128
The Supreme Court has not decided whether state principles of fo-
rum non conveniens are binding on a federal court sitting in diversity,
1 29
but current thought seems to be that they are not, 30 an assumption simi-
lar to many courts' conclusions that state law was inapplicable to forum-
124 See, e.g., The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 4 (1971) ("[Defendant] re-
sponded by invoking the forum clause of the towage contract, and moved to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction or on forum non conveniens grounds, or in the alternative to stay the action pend-
ing submission of the dispute to the 'London Court of Justice.' "); Coastal Steel Corp. v. Tilgh-
man Wheelabrator, 709 F.2d 190, 193 (3d Cir.) (motions to dismiss based on forum-selection
clause and on forum non conveniens grounds made in bankruptcy court), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 938 (1983); Snavely's Mill v. Officine Roncaglia, S.P.A., 678 F. Supp. 1126, 1131 (E.D.
Pa. 1987) (granting motion to dismiss based on forum-selection clause, thus not reaching de-
fendant's forum non conveniens motion); Diatronics v. Elbit Computers, 649 F. Supp. 122,
125, 127 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (determining that venue was proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) but
dismissing on basis of forum-selection clause and forum non conveniens).
125 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
126 These factors included: access to sources of proof; ability to force attendance of unwill-
ing witnesses; cost of obtaining willing witnesses; possibility to view premises (where appropri-
ate); practical trial considerations of speed and expense; enforceability of an obtained
judgment; advantages and obstacles to a fair trial; plaintiff's choice of forum; public interests,
such as congestion of courts or burden on a jury to hear a case that has no relation to the
community; local interest in having localized controversies decided at home; and having the
state whose law governs apply its own law in its own forum. Id. at 508-09.
127 Id. at 508. But cf. Walker v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 681 F. Supp. 470, 477 (N.D. Ill.
1987) (stating, in context of § 1404(a) transfer motion, that presumption in favor of plaintiff's
choice of forum shifts if defendant can show existence of valid prior agreement to litigate in
another federal forum).
128 See text accompanying notes 39-40 supra.
129 See Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 248 n.13 (1981); Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 509.
130 See Sibaja v. Dow Chem. Co., 757 F.2d 1215, 1219 (1lth Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
948 (1985); C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3828 (1986).
But see Note, supra note 122, at 327 (Erie requires federal courts to apply state law to forum
non conveniens motions).
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selection clauses after the Bremen decision.131 If state forum non con-
veniens principles are not binding on a diversity court, presumably the
principles of Gilbert and Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 132 including the pre-
sumption in favor of a plaintiff's choice of forum, will apply to motions
in federal court for forum-selection clause enforcement based on forum
non conveniens. Additionally, Stewart may give courts some guidance in
treating forum non conveniens motions because of the parallel nature of
forum non conveniens and the section 1404(a) transfer mechanism.1 33
4. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(3) provides for a motion to
dismiss for improper venue. It is triggered by the same defect that un-
derlies a section 1406(a) motion: noncompliance with the statutory
venue provisions in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391-1403. Just as section 1406(a) is
not an appropriate mechanism for honoring a forum-selection clause
where venue in the original forum is properly laid, Rule 12(b)(3) is simi-
larly inappropriate since motions under both provisions rest on the erro-
neous assumption that a forum-selection clause in itself creates
"improper" venue in noncontractual forums.13 4
Attorneys considering a 12(b)(3) motion should note that the Erie
issue regarding possible conflicts between the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure and state law on forum-selection clauses is unresolved. The Stew-
art Court did not address Rule 12(b)(3). 135  In addition, one
commentator has argued persuasively that state law should apply to a
motion to enforce a forum-selection clause based on Rule 12(b)(3). 136
Thus, at least where the relevant state law reflects a public policy against
forum-selection clauses, 137 Rule 12(b)(3) does carry some risk of non-
enforcement.
5. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), 12(b)(6), and
56
In a few cases, parties seeking forum-selection enforcement have re-
sorted to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that are entirely inappropriate
131 See notes 55-56 and accompanying text supra.
132 454 U.S. 235, 242 (1981) (plaintiff's choice of forum entitled to considerable deference).
133 See text accompanying note 121 supra; cf. Instrumentation Assoc. v. Madsen Elecs., 859
F.2d 4, 6 n.4 (3d Cir. 1988) (agreeing with parties that Stewart does not govern case where no
federal transfer statute is applicable; noting that parties "do not raise the common law doctrine
of 'forum non conveniens' to which § 1404(a) is related.").
134 See text accompanying notes 106"8, 116-18 supra.
135 See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 22-23 (1988); text accompanying
notes 176-94 infra.
136 See Note, supra note 65, at 1079.
137 See note 173 infra.
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for this purpose, reflecting the general confusion that permeates forum-
selection clause enforcement. For example, Rule 12(b)(1), which pro-
vides for a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,13 8
has been employed in several cases. 139 As is clear from the Supreme
Court's rejection of the ouster doctrine,14° however, there is no merit to
the notion that a forum-selection clause destroys the subject matter juris-
diction of a forum otherwise empowered to host the litigation. 14 1
Rule 12(b)(2) entitles a party to object to a lack of jurisdiction over
her person. 142 But forum-selection clauses cannot operate to defeat per-
sonal jurisdiction in a noncontractual forum. 143 Although the plaintiff
may have violated the forum-selection clause, the determination of
whether the noncontractual court has personal jurisdiction over the de-
fendant is independent of the forum-selection clause. Thus, Rule
12(b)(2) is a similarly inappropriate mechanism for forum-selection
clause enforcement.
Rule 12(b)(6) allows a party to move for dismissal for the plaintiff's
"failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted." 144 This rule is
an inappropriate mechanism for forum-selection clause enforcement; vio-
lation of the forum-selection clause does not mean that the plaintiff has
not stated a cause of action. Finally, a Rule 56 motion for summary
judgment is premised on the grounds that there is no issue of material
fact and that decision for one party may be had as a matter of law. The
motion should not be used to enforce a forum-selection clause because,
again, a forum-selection clause is unrelated to the merits of the underly-
ing dispute.
138 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
139 See, e.g., Seward v. Devine, 888 F.2d 957, 959, 962 (2d Cir. 1989) (affirming district
court's dismissal of contract claims under Rule 12(bX1)); Bryant Elec. Co. v. City of Freder-
icksburg, 762 F.2d 1192, 1196-97 (4th Cir. 1985) (district court denied 12(bXl) motion based
on forum-selection clause since it had subject matter jurisdiction, but found clause reasonable
and enforceable; court of appeals affirmed); LFC Lessors v. Pacific Sewer Maintenance Corp.,
739 F.2d 4, 7 (1st Cir. 1984) (motion to dismiss premised on Rule 12(bXl) and Rule 120,X3),
but court held that proper motion would be 12(bX6)); International Ass'n of Bridge Workers'
Local Union 348 v. Koski Constr. Co., 474 F. Supp. 370, 371 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (denying mo-
tion for remand premised on 12(b)(1)). Perhaps parties employ Rule 12(bX1) because a fo-
rum-selection clause may contain a "consent to the jurisdiction" of a particular court. See
note 10 supra. However, this is a loose usage of the term "jurisdiction." Forum-selection
clauses cannot oust a court of subject matter jurisdiction. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972).
140 See The Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12.
141 See notes 41-42 and accompanying text supra; text accompanying notes 46-49 supra.
142 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) (1988).
143 A forum-selection clause can constitute a waiver of a potential objection to personal
jurisdiction where it is lacking in the contractual forum. See note 10 supra.
144 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
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In sum, the lack of a "Zapata" motion 145 that contains the reason-
able, clearly articulated standards for forum-selection clause enforcement
articulated in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.146 created two
problems. First, lower courts' overly broad application of The Bremen
resulted in overenforcement of forum-selection clauses. Second, the lack
of a uniform motion created the confusing use of a multiplicity of mo-
tions, all ill-designed for the purpose of forum-selection clause enforce-
ment. This lack of a "Zapata" motion assured that any forum-selection
clause case decided by the Supreme Court would arise on a motion not
intended for forum-selection clause enforcement. Both these factors led
to the Supreme Court's decision in Stewart Organization, Ina v. Ricoh
Corp.,147 a case arising on a section 1404(a) motion, where, in addressing
a conflict-of-laws issue raised by forum-selection clauses, the Court
seized the opportunity to retreat from The Bremen.
II
CONFLICT-OF-LAWS ISSUES RAISED BY FORUM-SELECTION
CLAUSES
In addition to the problems brought on by the confused array of
motions at the attorney's disposal, forum-selection clause enforcement is
complicated by the question of whether federal or state enforcement
standards should apply. The Bremen, which spoke so strongly in favor
of enforcement, was a federal admiralty case. 148 However, federal courts
hearing a case in which subject matter jurisdiction is based on diversity
of citizenship do not look automatically to federal law. Instead, these
diversity courts first must consider whether Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins1 49 and its progeny require the application of state law. The
Erie determination is logically a threshold inquiry for a court, as the
court first must determine what is the appropriate body of law before it
can apply a standard of enforcement.150
Part A of this section discusses this important Erie question and
addresses the Supreme Court's discussion of the issue in Stewart Organi-
zation, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. 15 1 and the Erie issues left unresolved by the
Stewart Court. This Part argues that Stewart wrongly decided that fed-
145 See note 78 and accompanying text supra.
146 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
147 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
148 See text accompanying note 52 supra.
149 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
150 See In re Diaz Contracting, 817 F.2d 1047, 1050 (3d Cir. 1987) ("A preliminary concern
in determining the enforceability of a forum selection clause is what law, state or federal,
governs that determination.").
151 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
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eral law should apply to forum-selection clauses and that, where Stewart
does not apply, Erie case law dictates that state law apply to forum-selec-
tion clauses. Part B examines the ensuing question of which state's law
to apply to a clause.
A. Vertical Choice of Law:152 State or Federal?
In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,15 3 the Supreme Court held that
state, not federal, common law applies in federal court in diversity
cases. 154 The concern behind the Erie decision was that while a state
court always would apply state law, a federal court sitting in diversity in
the same state could reject that law on the same facts, and instead apply
whatever "federal law" it fashioned. This, it was feared, would create
disuniformity in the outcomes of similar cases between state and federal
courts in the same state.155 Thus, Erie purported to abolish general fed-
eral common law, and directed that state common law be applied in fed-
eral diversity courts.156 Erie did not, however, disturb the applicability
of federal law to matters of procedure,15 7 since these are considered mere
"housekeeping" details. Subsequent decisions have attempted to define a
test to distinguish between substantive and procedural rules.'
58
Under the Erie line of cases, it is important to determine what kind
of state and federal rules are in conflict. Where a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure conflicts with a state rule, the analysis of Hanna v. Plumer15 9
applies. Under Hanna-in which the Supreme Court held that a federal
court could apply its own service-of-process rules 1'°-the first question is
whether the federal rule is so broad as to cause a "direct collision" with
the state rule.161 If it is, the federal rule applies as long as it does not
exceed the constitutional power granted to the federal judiciary by the
152 In this Note, "vertical" choice of law refers to a choice between state and federal law.
"Horizontal" choice of law indicates a choice among state laws.
153 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
154 See id. at 78.
155 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (twin aims of Erie are "discouragement
of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws").
156 See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 ("There is no federal general common law. Congress has no
power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a State...."). But see Wheel-
din v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 663 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Mr. Justice Brandeis'
dictum: 'there is no federal general common law,'... cannot, of course, be taken at its full
breadth."); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 307 (1947) (federal power for
dealing with essentially federal matters remains unimpaired).
157 See Erie, 304 U.S. at 92 (Reed, J., concurring in part) ("[N]o one doubts federal power
over procedure.").
158 See Comment, supra note 2, at 1099 ("After Erie, federal courts had difficulty distin-
guishing between substantive issues and procedural issues." (footnote omitted)).
159 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
160 See id. at 463-64.
161 See id. at 471-72.
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Rules Enabling Act.162 Where the federal rule does not conflict squarely
with the state rule, the court simply must ask whether applying the fed-
eral rule would violate either of the twin aims of Erie,1 63 namely the
discouragement of forum shopping and avoidance of inequitable adminis-
tration of the laws. 164 In Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.,165 the Court held
that a failure to meet either prong of this test would warrant the applica-
tion of state law.166
When the federal rule that arguably conflicts with state law is not a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, the two-pronged Hanna analysis does
not apply. Instead, Hanna requires that a modified version of the Erie
analysis developed in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative gov-
ern.167 Accordingly, the court must ask whether the state rule is tightly
or loosely bound up with state-created rights and obligations 68 and
whether the application of federal law would be outcome-determinative
in that it would violate the twin aims of Erie.169 The court then must
balance state concerns and Erie's twin aims with any affirmative counter-
vailing considerations militating in favor of use of the federal rule.17 0
Application of either of these two Hanna tests should result in the use of
state law except where either the federal rule is a mere housekeeping
detail or the federal interest is so strong as to overcome a conflicting state
interest.
The Erie issue is of more than passing concern in the forum-selec-
tion clause context because forum-selection clauses are neither clearly
substantive nor clearly procedural.171 Although The Bremen established
a "federal" standard that is favorable to enforcement, many forum-selec-
tion clause cases in federal court are diversity cases. Some states view
forum-selection clauses as contrary to public policy, 172 thus raising a
162 See id.; Comment, supra note 2, at 1100 n.51.
163 See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 752-53 (1980).
164 See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 467.
165 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
166 See id. at 752.
167 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
168 See id. at 535-36.
169 See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
170 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,472 (1965); Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537; Note, supra note
122, at 318.
171 Forum-selection clauses are "procedural" in the sense that they lay venue, but the
clauses are also "substantive" in that they are an integral part of the parties' contractual agree-
ment. See Farmland Indus. v. Frazier-Parrott Commodities, 806 F.2d 848, 852 (8th Cir.
1986); Gruson, supra note 2, at 154; Comment, supra note 2, at 1091 n.12; Note, supra note
15, at 452. The Supreme Court has not resolved this issue, although in Stewart, where the
forum-selection clause issue arose on a motion to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), it
held that § 1404(a), a procedural statute, controls the issue. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh
Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988); text accompanying notes 191-94 infra.
172 Three states, Alabama, Georgia, and Missouri, still have a public policy against forum-
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
may 1991]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
conflict between state and federal law in diversity cases. Until recently,
few lower courts explicitly had considered this issue; many simply ap-
plied The Bremen without discussion.173 Those that had discussed the
issue were in conflict. 174
L Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.
In 1988, Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. 175 provided the
Supreme Court with an opportunity to decide whether state or federal
law should govern forum-selection clauses. The parties to the Stewart
case were the Stewart Organization, an Alabama copy machine dealer,
and the Ricoh Corporation, a New York manufacturer with its principal
place of business in New Jersey. 176 The two parties had entered into a
contract that contained a clause specifying that all disputes were to be
aired in courts situated in the borough of Manhattan. 177 In contraven-
tion of that provision, the Stewart Organization brought suit against
selection clauses. The decisions in which forum-selection clauses were held unenforceable are:
Redwing Carriers v. Foster, 382 So. 2d 554, 556 (Ala. 1980); Cartridge Rental Network v.
Video Entertainment, 132 Ga. App. 748, 748, 209 S.E.2d 132, 133 (1974); State ex rel. Goose-
neck Trailer Mfg. Co. v. Barker, 619 S.W.2d 928, 930 (Mo. App. 1981). Puerto Rico has a
statute providing that a clause in a dealer agreement requiring the dealer to litigate in a foreign
venue is void as a matter of public policy. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit 10 § 278b-2 (Supp. 1987),
cited in Royal Bed & Spring Co. v. Famossul Indus., 906 F.2d 45, 47, 48 (lst Cir. 1990).
Various other states apply differing tests. See Annotation, supra note 41, at 409-20.
Although the law of only a few jurisdictions contains a strict public policy against forum-
selection clauses, a serious Erie concern is raised since, if federal law does not govern the issue
of forum-selection clause enforcement, the plaintiff may choose a forum in which the law of
one of these jurisdictions is likely to be applied to defeat the forum-selection clause.
173 See Citro Fla. v. Citrovale, S.A., 760 F.2d 1231, 1232 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam)
(interpretation of forum-selection clause based upon The Bremen without discussion of state
law); see also Mullenix, supra note 33, at 313 ('It is rare that a federal court even questions
The Bremen's applicability to domestic cases based in federal question or diversity jurisdic-
tion." (footnote omitted)).
174 Compare Bense v. Interstate Battery Sys. of Am., 683 F.2d 718, 721-22 (2d Cir. 1982)
(explicitly declining to apply Texas law, which disfavored forum-selection clauses) and Moretti
& Perlow Law Offices v. Aleet Assocs., 668 F. Supp. 103, 105 (D.R.I. 1987) ("Forum selection
clauses, then, are merely privately bargained procedural rules adjunct to the operation of
§ 1406(a). As such, they are subject to a governing federal common law rule filling in the
'interstices' of that statute.") with Farmland Indus. v. Frazier-Parrott Commodities, 806 F.2d
848, 852 (8th Cir. 1986) ("Because of the close relationship between substance and procedure
in this case we believe that consideration should have been given to the public policy of Mis-
souri."); General Eng'g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, 783 F.2d 352, 357 (3d Cir. 1986)
("The interpretation of forum selection clauses in commercial contracts is not an area of law
that ordinarily requires federal courts to create substantive law.") and Snider v. Lone Star Art
Trading Co., 672 F. Supp 977, 981 (E.D. Mich. 1987) ("Since no federal statute which evinces
a preference for the enforcement of a forum selection clause is apparent in this record, state
law must govern with regard to this contract clause.").
175 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
176 Id. at 24.
177 Id. at 24 n.1.
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Ricoh in the Northern District of Alabama for alleged breach of the
dealership agreement. Ricoh made a motion under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a)171 to transfer the case to the Southern District of New York, a
venue within the contract's forum-selection clause, or to dismiss under
28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). 179 The district judge held that Alabama law, which
disfavors forum-selection clauses, controlled the question of enforceabil-
ity of the forum-selection clause, and denied the motion.180 The district
court certified its ruling to the Eleventh Circuit for interlocutory review
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 181 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding that federal law governed forum-selec-
tion clauses.18 2 The court applied the Bremen principles to enforce the
clause.183
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals's decision to en-
force the clause'84 but rejected the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning.185 In-
stead, the Court characterized the case as presenting a conflict between
section 1404(a) and Alabama law rather than as one addressing the more
general issue of a conflict between federal and state law concerning fo-
rum-selection clause enforcement.' 8 6 According to the Court, the ques-
178 Id. Section 1404(a) allows a party to obtain a transfer of venue within the federal court
system where the judge finds that it would be more convenient for the parties and witnesses
and in the interest of justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988); note 69 supra.
179 See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 24. Section 1406(a) allows a party to obtain a dismissal or
transfer of venue when a plaintiff has filed suit in a district in which venue is improper. 28
U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1988); see text accompanying notes 104-05 supra. The Stewart Court noted
that the use of § 1406(a) is inappropriate where venue is proper under the applicable statute.
See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 28 n. 8.
180 See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 24.
181 See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 779 F.2d 643, 645 (1986), vacated, 810 F.2d 1066
(I1th Cir. 1987) (en banc), rev'd, 487 U.S. 22 (1988). 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1988) provides, in
pertinent part:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable
under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question
of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an
immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of
the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals which
would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its discretion,
permit an appeal to be taken from such order ....
Id.
182 See Stewart, 779 F.2d at 647.
183 A single dissenting judge would have held that Erie required the application of state law
to the clause. See id. at 651-53 (Godbold, J., dissenting). On rehearing, he was joined by four
of his colleagues. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 810 F.2d 1066, 1076 (1lth Cir. 1987)
(en banc) (Godbold, J., dissenting).
184 See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 25.
185 See id. at 28-29 ("Although we agree with the Court of Appeals that the Bremen case
may prove 'instructive' in resolving the parties' dispute... we disagree with the court's articu-
lation of the relevant inquiry as 'whether the forum selection clause in this case is unenforce-
able under the standards set forth in The Bremen.' ").
186 See id.
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tion of whether to apply section 1404(a) to the forum-selection clause
"involves a considerably less intricate analysis than that which involves
the 'relatively unguided Erie choice.' "187 Although section 1404(a) is
devoid of any reference to forum-selection clauses, 188 the Court con-
cluded that ordinary section 1404(a) analysis should determine whether
to enforce the forum-selection clause.18 9 Accordingly, the Court found
that a forum-selection clause is a "significant factor" in a court's balanc-
ing of a "number of case-specific factors" on a motion to transfer venue
under section 1404(a). 190 Noting that where a federal statute controls a
question, the only remaining inquiry is whether the statute is constitu-
tional, 191 the Court stated, "[i]f Congress intended to reach the issue
before the district court, and if it enacted its intention into law in a man-
ner that abides with the Constitution, that is the end of the matter."'1 92 It
then proceeded to a discussion of the application of section 1404(a).193
The Court thus made a hard case easier by framing its decision as
one of venue, not of forum-selection clauses per se. Once the Court char-
acterized the case as one in which the state policy conflicted with a fed-
eral venue statute, the Court's holding is not surprising.1 94 Under Erie,
venue is procedural, and thus federal law applies. As a federal statutory
venue transfer device, section 1404(a) is an arguably "procedural,"
housekeeping provision, which, under the Hanna v. Plumer1lg interpre-
tation of Erie, means that it overrides parallel, conflicting state rules.
However, by stretching section 1404(a) to govern the forum-selection
clause, the majority imported substantive elements of the contracting
process into the section 1404(a) analysis, in effect lessening the proce-
dural nature of the statute. 196 The Court ignored the substantive, con-
187 Id.
188 See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); see also Comment, supra note 6, at 1415 ("Because section
1404(a) does not address forum selection clauses, the Court's construction of it in Ricoh was
not compelled by the plain meaning of that statute.").
189 See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 29.
190 See id.
191 See id. at 27.
192 Id.
193 See id. at 28-31.
194 See Mullenix, supra note 33, at 334 ("Framing the issue as a venue-transfer problem
clearly answered the Erie dilemma, because it followed ineluctably that venue would be
deemed procedural for Erie purposes.").
195 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
196 Justice Scalia stated:
In holding that the validity between the parties of a forum-selection clause falls within
the scope of § 1404(a), the Court inevitably imports... a new retrospective element into
the court's deliberations, requiring examination of what the facts were concerning, among
other things; the bargaining power of the parties and the presence or absence of overreach-
ing at the time the contract was made.... It is difficult to believe that state contract law
was meant to be pre-empted by this provision that we have said "should be regarded as a
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tractual aspects of forum-selection clauses when it treated the clause as a
factor in the section 1404(a) analysis, rather than seeing section 1404(a)
for what it was in Stewart: a mechanism for forum-selection clause
enforcement.
Thus, the Stewart Court's Erie analysis was fundamentally mis-
guided. The Court cast the Erie question as whether section 1404(a) "is
'sufficiently broad to control the issue before the Court.' ",197 However,
as the dissent correctly stated, "in deciding whether a federal procedural
statute or Rule of Procedure encompasses a particular issue, a broad
reading that would create significant disuniformity between state and
federal courts should be avoided if the text permits."'198 The Court ad-
mitted that previous cases had examined whether there was a "direct
collision" between the state and federal rules, but it claimed that this
language actually stated the test of whether the federal law is broad
enough to cover the issue. 199
The Stewart majority read section 1404(a) broadly, stretching it be-
yond its ordinary scope to cover the enforceability of the forum-selection
clause, instead of determining whether there was in fact a direct collision
between the two rules that would require the supremacy of federal
law.20° Somehow the Court found that section 1404(a) is broad enough
to occupy the field in which the state law operates. 201 Yet a few
paragraphs later, the Court conceded, "[ilt is true that § 1404(a) and Al-
abama's putative policy regarding forum-selection clauses are not per-
fectly coextensive. ' 20 2 How these two conclusions can be reconciled is
unclear. Even less apparent is how section 1404(a) analysis controls the
treatment of forum-selection clauses when the statute never addresses
them.203 In manufacturing a conflict where there need not have been
one, the Court gave short shrift to a fundamental policy of Erie, namely
achieving substantial uniformity of outcome between federal and state
federal judicial housekeeping measure[ ]"....
Stewart, 487 U.S. at 34, 37 (quoting VanDusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 636-37 (1964))
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis altered).
197 Id. at 26 (quoting Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1980)).
198 Id. at 37-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
199 See id. at 26 n.4.
200 See id. at 35 (Scalla, J., dissenting) (majority gave § 1404(a) "novel scope").
201 See id. at 29.
202 Id. at 30.
203 See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Justice Scalia, dissenting in Stewart, argued that "[slection
1404(a) is simply a venue provision that nowhere mentions contracts or agreements, much less
that the validity of certain contracts or agreements will be matters of federal law." Stewart,
487 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Note, supra note 15, at 447-51 (language of
§ 1404(a), its legislative history, and circumstances surrounding its enactment all indicate that
Congress never intended it to govern forum-selection clauses).
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courts. 2 4 In deciding whether Alabama's policy against forum-selection
clauses should be applied to prevent transfer of the case to the District
Court for the Southern District of New York, or whether a federal law
that rendered the clause enforceable should govern the transfer motion,
the Court could have framed the issue as whether the federal policy of
enforcing forum-selection clauses, as reflected in The Bremen, could ap-
ply in the face of a conflicting state policy. 20 5 Under Hanna, this ques-
tion would mandate a pure Erie analysis along the Byrd/Guaranty Trust
line of inquiry2°6 and would result in a principle applicable to all forum-
selection clause cases.207
Justice Scalia filed a well-reasoned dissent in Stewart. He conducted
an Erie analysis similar to that employed by the majority, rejecting the
concurrence's view that judge-made law is appropriate in this context.208
However, Justice Scalia first found that the federal statute does not gov-
ern the question, and then he conducted a traditional Erie analysis to
determine whether judge-made law would violate the twin aims of
Erie.209 He found that it would, stating, "[w]ith respect to forum-selec-
tion clauses, in a State with law unfavorable to validity, plaintiffs who
seek to avoid the effect of the clause will be encouraged to sue in state
204 See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
205 Other members of the Stewart Court took this approach. Justice Scalia, in his dissent,
examined whether federal judge-made law could govern the issue, since, in his opinion,
§ 1404(a) did not. See id. at 38. He found that Erie mandated application of state law. See id.
at 39.
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor, filed a brief concurrence in which he cited
only The Bremen and none of the Erie line of cases. See id. at 33 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
His position seems to be that the reasoning of The Bremen should be applied even outside the
admiralty area because of the interest of the federal judicial system in "the correct resolution of
these questions." Id. at 33. This quasi-Eie analysis is subject to criticism on the ground that
it does not follow the governing decisions. However, it may reinfuse some life into The
Bremen to the extent that lower courts heed the concurrence and not the majority opinion.
See, e.g., Jones v. Weibrecht, 901 F.2d 17, 18-19 (2d Cir. 1990) (decision whether to remand
case to state court to honor forum-selection clause not governed by Stewart, whose holding
was limited to § 1404(a) context; "federal rule" of The Bremen continues to apply to forum-
selection clauses after Stewart).
206 See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); text accompanying notes 168-71 supra.
207 The Stewart Court based its conclusion on the HannalWalker/Burlington Northern line
of cases, all of which concern the conflict of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, not a federal
statute, with a state rule. Although the analysis employed in these cases arguably could apply
to the issue in Stewart, since a federal statute is as much a reflection of the exercise of Con-
gress's constitutional power as is a Federal Rule, the Stewart Court did not give adequate
attention to the fact that it was applying the analysis developed under the Federal Rules cases.
The Court simply cited these cases as governing the question of whether to apply a federal
statute that conflicts with a state rule, observing in a footnote that the Hanna Rules Enabling
Act test does not apply to a federal statute. See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 22, 26-27 & n.5.
208 See id. at 33.
209 See id. at 38-40.
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court, and non-resident defendants will be encouraged to shop for more
favorable law by removing to federal court. ' 210 Thus, he determined
that Erie warranted application of state law, a view that is supported by
some commentators. 2
11
Given the Stewart Court's manifest lack of adherence to Erie princi-
ples, the best explanation for the Court's decision is that it was a result-
oriented response to overenforcement of forum-selection clauses under
the Bremen standard.212 The Court may have seen the Stewart case as an
opportunity to cut back on The Bremen's reach without overruling it. If
that was its hope, the Court was remarkably successful in its endeavor, as
lower courts continue to cite and apply The Bremen while simultane-
ously applying the Stewart 1404(a) balancing test.213
Not surprisingly, given the state of forum-selection clause analysis,
the Stewart decision has created confusion in the lower courts. For fo-
rum-selection clause motions brought under section 1404(a), lower
courts now have a new test to apply: they must perform the balancing
test provided for by the federal procedural statute, weighing the forum-
selection clause as one factor in deciding whether fairness and the con-
venience of the parties favor transfer.214 Thus, according to the Court,
"[i]t is conceivable in a particular case,... that because of these factors a
District Court acting under section 1404(a) would refuse to transfer a
case notwithstanding the counterweight of a forum-selection clause,
whereas the coordinate state rule might dictate the opposite result. ' 21 5
Although prior to Stewart forum-selection clause enforcement was
in a state of some confusion,216 at least there was a measure of predict-
ability: if The Bremen were applied, the clause would be enforced, and if
a state "ouster" policy were applied, it would not be. After Stewart, even
this modest level of clarity is lost,217 since enforcement under Stewart's
210 Id. at 40.
211 See, e.g., Note, supra note 122, at 329; Note, supra note 15, at 456; Note, supra note 65,
at 1079.
212 See Comment, supra note 6, at 1416 ('Of course, the Court's ability to determine out-
come is easily manipulated and no doubt influences its interpretation of a statute or Rule.
Such influence is illustrated in Ricoh by comparing the majority decision with the dissent.");
text accompanying notes 184-93, 200-04, 208-11 supra.
213 See note 232 and accompanying text infra.
214 See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 29.
215 Id. (footnote omitted).
216 See text accompanying notes 61-66 supra.
217 See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 28-29 (acknowledging The Bremen but adopting discretionary
balancing inquiry). There have been various proposals to solve some of the problems caused
by Stewart, including applying state law to forum-selection clause issues not arising in the
§ 1404(a) context, see Note, supra note 65, at 1079; overruling Stewart and applying state law
to all such clauses, see Note, supra note 15, at 456-58; and creating a "procedural" federal
common law favoring forum-selection clauses; see Comment, supra note 2, at 1122.
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"highly discretionary standard ' 218 is variable and perhaps arbitrary.219
The subsequent history of the Stewart case illustrates this instability: on
remand, the Stewart trial court, applying federal law, performed the re-
quired balancing test and still found the clause unenforceable. 2 20 After
so ruling, the district judge refused to certify his order for appeal.221
However, in In re Ricoh Corp., the Eleventh Circuit granted Ricoh's peti-
tion for a writ of mandamus to compel transfer.222 The In re Ricoh Corp.
decision may have further muddied the waters. The Eleventh Circuit
determined that forum-selection clauses alter the burden of persuasion
on motions to transfer, stating: "[W]e see no reason why a court should
accord deference to the forum in which the plaintiff filed its action. Such
deference to the filing forum would only encourage parties to violate
their contractual obligations, the integrity of which are vital to our sys-
tem. '2 23 Other courts have taken affront at this language, finding that it
renders a forum-selection clause dispositive of the transfer issue rather
than a mere factor in the decision, as the Supreme Court said it should
be.224
Post-Stewart confusion is manifested in cases confronting several re-
maining open questions. First, it is not clear whether Stewart applies
218 Jones v. Weibrecht, 901 F.2d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1990); see also Red Bull Assocs. v. Best W.
Int'l, 862 F.2d 963, 967 (2d Cir. 1988) ("Post the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Stewart,
it is clear that a district court has even broader discretion to decide transfer motions under
§ 1404(a) than was provided by Bremen.").
219 See Comment, supra note 6, at 1380 ("TIThe Court has transformed the [forum-selection
clause] issue from a question of law into a matter of judicial discretion."). Compare Fibra-
Steel v. Astoria Indus., 708 F. Supp. 255, 257 (E.D. Mo. 1989) (refusing to enforce clause
under § 1404(a)); Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 696 F. Supp. 583, 588-91 (N.D. Ala.
1988) (same), mandamus granted, In re Ricoh Corp. 870 F.2d 570 (11th Cir. 1989), motion for
stay of mandamus denied, Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 713 F. Supp. 1419, 1419 (N.D.
Ala. 1989) with Advent Elecs. v. Samsung Semiconductor, 709 F. Supp. 843, 845-47 (N.D. Ill.
1989) (enforcing clause after balancing § 1404(a) factors).
220 See Stewart, 696 F. Supp. at 591 ("Not only because of the presumption favoring a
plaintiff's choice of forum and Ricoh's failure here to present evidence sufficient to rebut that
presumption, but because both the private and public interests militate against a transfer to
Manhattan, this court concludes that the Northern District of Alabama is an entirely appro-
priate forum for trying this action.").
221 See In re Ricoh Corp., 870 F.2d 570, 572 n.4 (1989).
222 See id. at 574. The Stewart Organization then moved for a stay of the writ of mandamus
so that it could file a petition with the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The District
Court denied Stewart's motion to stay and issued the transfer order. See Stewart Org., Inc. v.
Ricoh Corp., 713 F. Supp. 1419, 1419 (N.D. Ala. 1989).
223 In re Ricoh Corp., 870 F.2d at 573. This language does not seem entirely consistent with
the standard established by the Supreme Court. It will be interesting to see whether lower
courts outside the Eleventh Circuit, and thus not bound by In re Ricoh, will apply this inter-
pretation of the Stewart decision.
224 See Hoffman v. Minuteman Press Int'l, 747 F. Supp. 552, 554 (W.D. Mo. 1990); Stewart
v. Dean-Michaels Corp., 716 F. Supp. 1400, 1405 (N.D. Ala. 1989).
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outside the section 1404(a) context,225 although the better reading of the
opinion would limit it to section 1404(a) motions.226 If this is so, the
next logical question is whether state or federal law applies to the other
motions used to enforce forum-selection clauses in federal diversity
cases.227 Some post-Stewart courts have avoided deciding this thorny is-
sue either by finding that all the laws that possibly could govern the mo-
tion to enforce a forum-selection clause favor enforcement 228 or by
225 Compare Instrumentation Assocs. v. Madsen Elecs., 859 F.2d 4, 6 n.4 (3d Cir. 1988)
(agreeing with parties that Stewart is inapposite where motion to dismiss to honor forum-
selection clause is based on Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(bX6) and contractual forum is outside reach of
§ 1404(a)) and Crescent Int'l v. Avatar Communities, Inc., 857 F.2d 943, 944 (3d Cir. 1988)
(finding Stewart holding inapplicable where no motion to transfer involved) with Ritchie v.
Carvel Corp., 714 F. Supp. 700, 702 & nI.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding motion to dismiss based
on forum-selection clause governed by federal law under Stewart) and Page Constr. Co. v.
Perini Constr., 712 F. Supp. 9, 11-12 (D.R.I. 1989) (considering motion to dismiss under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(bX6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) and enforcing forum-selection clause under stan-
dards of § 1404(a)).
226 See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Richo Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988) ("A motion to transfer
under § 1404(a) thus calls on the District Court to weigh in the balance a number of case-
specific factors." (emphasis added)); see also Jones v. Weibrecht, 901 F.2d 17, 19 (2d Cir.
1990) (since Stewart Court only decided issue of whether state or federal law governed
§ 1404(a) transfer motion, its reasoning not applicable to motion to dismiss or to remand case
to state court); Note, supra note 122, at 310 (1989) ('Stewart did not resolve whether, in
diversity suits, federal or state law governs enforceability of forum selection clauses designating
foreign courts." (emphasis in original)); Note, supra note 65, at 1069-70 (Supreme Court in
fact avoided Erie issue raised by forum-selection clauses by deciding Stewart in such narrow
procedural context).
227 The Stewart decision gives no guidance on the application of Erie principles to forum-
selection clause enforcement outside the context of the § 1404(a) motion. See, e.g., Manetti-
Farrow v. Gucci Am., 858 F.2d 509, 512 n.2 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Our case involves a motion to
dismiss, rather than to transfer venue, and because there is no federal rule directly on point the
Stewart [Erie] analysis is inapplicable."); American Performance v. Sanford, 749 F. Supp.
1094, 1095 (M.D. Ala. 1990) (analysis of motion to dismiss to enforce forum-selection clause,
noting that Stewart case was factually distinguishable); Note, supra note 65, at 1075 (painting
out Stewart's lack of guidance for 12(bX3) motion to dismiss based on forum-selection clause).
The Stewart Court gave no indication of how it would treat any other motions, except for a
motion to dismiss or transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1406, which it stated was inapposite since
venue was "proper" in the original forum. See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 28 n.8; Note, supra note 8,
at 191 & n.94.
228 See, e.g., Instrumentation Assocm, 859 F.2d at 8-9 (forum-selection clause enforceable
under Pennsylvania, Ontario, and federal judge-made law); Crescent, 857 F.2d at 944 (forum-
selection clause enforceable under federal, Florida, or Pennsylvania law, "the jurisdictions...
which could conceivably govern this question"). It is notable that both of these cases are
Third Circuit cases; prior to Stewart, Third Circuit case law consistently held that enforcement
of forum-selection clauses was a matter of state law. See, e.g., In re Diaz Contracting, 817
F.2d 1047, 1050 (3d Cir. 1987) (state law applies to determination of enforceability of forum-
selection clause unless there is significant conflict with federal policy or interest); General
Eng'g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, 783 F.2d 352, 357 (3d Cir. 1986) ('The interpreta-
tion of forum selection clauses in commercial contracts is not an area of law that ordinarily
requires federal courts to create substantive law."); Mutual Fire, Marine and Inland Ins. Co. v.
Barry, 646 F. Supp. 831, 833 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (interpretation of forum-selection clauses is
governed by state law).
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
May 1991]
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
converting a dismissal motion into a section 1404(a) transfer motion,229
apparently under the misconception that Stewart requires the latter pro-
cedure where the contractual forum is another federal court.23° Those
that have addressed the issue directly have applied federal law.231 Fi-
nally, it is unclear to what extent The Bremen has survived Stewart in
diversity cases, although lower courts continue to apply it on a variety of
theories.232
229 See Page Constr. Co., 712 F. Supp. at 11-12 (dismissal motion under § 1406(a) and Rule
12(bX6) treated as § 1404(a) transfer motion and granted under Stewart standards); TUC Elec.
v. Eagle Telephonics, 698 F. Supp. 35, 38 (D. Conn. 1988) (dismissal motion under § 1406(a)
considered as if made under § 1404(a)).
230 See TUC Elec., 698 F. Supp. at 38 n.3 ("A recent Supreme Court case has settled [the]
confusion [over what law applies to these clauses], holding that the effect of a forum-selection
clause on federal venue is governed by § 1404(a).").
231 See, e.g., Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 374 (7th Cir. 1990)
(finding that parties' agreement that federal law should apply does not exceed appropriate
limits); Jones v. Weibrecht, 901 F.2d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1990) (applying The Bremen to forum-
selection clause); Seward v. Devine, 888 F.2d 957, 962 (2d Cir. 1989) (citing only The Bremen
in affirming 12(b)(1) dismissal of contract claims based on forum-selection clause); Manetti-
Farrow, 858 F.2d at 512 (after conducting Erie analysis, concluding that federal law, in form of
The Bremen, applies); American Performance, 749 F. Supp. at 1095-97 (stating that Stewart is
factually distinguishable but that Erie analysis indicates that federal law applies); Venners v.
Kimball Int'l, 749 F. Supp. 714, 715 (E.D. Va. 1990) (although state law governs contract
issues, Stewart decision is housekeeping rule and does not affect substantive rights, therefore
federal law applies).
232 See, e.g., Seward, 888 F.2d at 962 (applying The Bremen to forum-selection clause,
without reference to Stewart); Paribas Corp. v. Shelton Ranch Corp., 742 F. Supp. 86, 90
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (on motion to dismiss or transfer out of contractual forum, stating that The
Bremen standard applies in Second Circuit); Brock v. Entre Computer Centers, 740 F. Supp.
428, 431 (E.D. Tex. 1990) ("In light of the Supreme Court's declaration that THE BREMEN
'may prove instructive' in resolving disputes over forum selection clauses in domestic cases....
this court is so instructed."); Ritchie v. Carvel Corp., 714 F. Supp. 700, 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(citing Stewart for proposition that federal law applies to forum-selection clauses, and applying
The Bremen); cf. Instrumentation Assocs., 859 F.2d at 7 n.5 CRicoh leaves open the question of
whether the holding in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. ... applying federal judge-made
law to the issue of a forum selection clause's validity in admiralty cases, should be extended to
diversity cases.").
The Stewart Court's instructions were confusing at best. It stated: "Although we agree
with the Court of Appeals that the Bremen case may prove 'instructive' in resolving the par-
ties' dispute,... we disagree with the court's articulation of the relevant inquiry as 'whether
the forum selection clause in this case is unenforceable under the standards set forth in The
Bremen." Stewart Org., Inc., v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 28-29 (1988). The concurrence
may have reinfused some life into The Bremen. Justice Kennedy stated, "Although our opin-
ion in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co ... involved a Federal District Court sitting in
admiralty, its reasoning applies with much force to federal courts sitting in diversity." Id. at
33 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
The Bremen is still good law in federal admiralty cases. See Carnival Cruise Lines v.
Shute, 111 S.Ct. 1522, 1525 (1991) (noting that in admiralty law, federal law governs forum-
selection clause, and applying The Bremen); Transway Shipping v. Underwriters at Lloyd's,
717 F. Supp. 82, 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (The Bremen "continues to govern in admiralty cases in
the wake of the Supreme Court's ruling in [Stewart].").
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2. Post-Stewart Application of Erie to Forum-Selection Clauses
Since Stewart probably does not apply to forum-selection clauses
outside the section 1404(a) context,233 courts must still confront the Erie
question that arises when a defendant makes a motion to enforce a fo-
rum-selection clause under a provision other than section 1404(a).23 A
straightforward Erie analysis compels the conclusion that state law
should apply to forum-selection clause motions.-35 Where a state policy
against forum-selection clauses is implicated on a motion to enforce such
a clause under a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, Hanna v. Plumer236
precludes application of the federal rule unless it squarely conflicts with
the state policy.237 It is difficult indeed to argue that any of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, none of which refer to forum-selection clauses,
squarely conflicts with a state policy against such clauses.238 Once it is
233 See note 228 supra.
234 Although the Stewart decision may endorse the use of § 1404(a) for forum-selection
enforcement to some extent, and although there are problems with the use of other motions to
enforce forum-selection clauses, see notes 67-148 and accompanying text supra, in the absence
of a rulebook "Zapata" motion or a directive by the Supreme Court to use § 1404(a) and
nothing else, the other motions remain mere possibilities in the present system. Although
some courts have converted other motions to § 1404(a) motions, they can only do so when the
contractual forum is another federal court, as § 1404(a) operates only to effect transfers be-
tween federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). One commentator states that parties may "sub-
vert" Stewart by specifying foreign or state courts in their forum-selection clauses. See
Comment, supra note 6, at 1380 n.10. It is certainly true that such a clause could avoid the
effect of Stewart, but the use of the word "subvert" implies that Stewart was intended to apply
to all forum-selection clause motions. However, there is no authority that suggests that the
Stewart decision was an attempt to establish rules for all forum-selection clause enforcement
regardless of the context in which such clauses arise and regardless of the forum specified in
the clause.
235 See Alexander Proudfoot Co. World Headquarters v. Thayer, 877 F.2d 912, 916-19
(11th Cir. 1989) (conducting extensive Erie analysis and determining that state law governs
consent-to-jurisdiction clause).
Forum-selection clauses that are not followed implicate two courts: the contractual fo-
rum and the noncontractual forum in which the plaintiff has brought suit. Although forum-
selection clauses often implicate the policies of two different states, this does not mean federal
law should apply. There is no plausible reading of the Erie line of cases that allows the appli-
cation of a federal common law standard solely because multiple state policies may be impli-
cated. See text accompanying notes 241-42 infra. The Stewart Court refocused the issue by
finding a federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), that it said controlled the question. See Stewart,
487 U.S. at 25-26. However, this is not the only procedural posture in which forum-selection
clause issues arise. See notes 68-76 and accompanying text supra. Probably the best solution
to the Erie dilemma would be a federal statute codifying the Bremen test for an enforceable
forum-selection clause and mandating enforcement of such clauses in multi-state cases. Such a
statute, unlike § 1404(a), would directly conflict with a contrary state rule. Congress could
pass the statute under the authority of Article III of the Constitution. See U.S. Const. art. 111;
note 78 supra.
236 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
237 See id. at 470-71.
238 See Note, supra note 65, at 1075-76 (1989) (discussing Rule 12(bX3), which only con-
cerns time at which motion to dismiss for improper venue is made and nowhere addresses
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determined that a federal rule is not squarely in conflict with the state
policy, state law must apply to avoid the differences in outcome that Erie
condemns. 239
If a defendant simply makes a "motion to dismiss to honor the fo-
rum-selection clause," one not premised on any statutory motion or Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure, the only arguably applicable federal law is
contained in The Bremen. However, the Bremen Court applied judge-
made federal law, which should not apply to a forum-selection clause in
the face of judge-made state law.240 The Court in Erie stated that
"[t]here is no federal general common law,"'241 and Ere principles man-
date that state law be applied where federal law would result in a differ-
ence in outcome likely to affect the choice of forum.242 In the forum-
selection clause context, application of The Bremen might result in dis-
missal of the case from the plaintiff's chosen forum, whereas application
of state law would not. This might encourage plaintiffs to forum shop
between state and federal court and result in inequitable differences in
outcome depending on where the suit was heard. Thus, state law must
apply.
If state law applies to forum-selection clauses, another dilemma
arises. Inequities in outcome can arise within the federal court system
depending on whether the state law the court applies favors forum-selec-
tion clauses or not.243 Differing state laws thus create some lack of hori-
zontal uniformity within the federal system.244 The alternative, however,
is a lack of vertical uniformity, that is, a difference in outcome between
federal and state court, which is exactly what Erie condemns. 245
existence or validity of forum-selection clause as factor to be considered in ruling on 12(bX3)
motions).
239 See text accompanying notes 167-70 supra.
240 But see Comment, supra note 2, at 1102-03, 1111-22 (arguing for new federal common
law governing forum-selection clauses).
241 Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). But see Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373
U.S. 647, 663 (1963) (federal power for dealing with essentially federal matters remains
unimpaired).
242 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S.
99, 109 (1945); Erie, 304 U.S. at 78; text accompanying notes 160-64 supra.
243 See note 172 supra.
244 Perhaps this is the reason some courts and commentators have favored fashioning a
"federal common law." Although it has its advantages, it is not supported by Erie doctrine.
One alternative would be for Congress to validate forum-selection clauses legislatively, as it did
for arbitration agreements. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988). A "Zapata" motion-designed spe-
cifically for forum-selection clause enforcement-promulgated by the Supreme Court and in-
cluded in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would serve as the mechanism to raise the
procedural objection. See note 78 supra.
245 See Erie, 304 U.S. at 74-77; Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 109; see also Comment, supra
note 2, at 1115 ("The Erie court was primarily concerned with forum shopping between fed-
eral and state courts.").
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B. Horizontal Choice of Law: Which State's Law?
If state law applies to forum-selection clause enforcement, as this
Note argues it should, 246 the question for a federal district court sitting in
diversity is which state's law to apply. A court could decide the forum-
selection clause issue prior to considering which state's law is applicable,
in which case it will apply forum law.247 This approach has the disad-
vantage that district courts of four jurisdictions would not enforce fo-
rum-selection clauses under any circumstances. 248 Additionally, this
approach, perhaps reflective of a feeling that "procedural" matters such
as forum selection are decided prior to choice-of-law, ignores the sub-
stantive, contractual nature of a forum-selection clause.
An arguably superior procedure is for the noncontractual forum
first to determine which law governs interpretation of the contract and
then to apply that law to determine the enforceability249 of the forum-
selection clause. Where the contract does not contain a choice-of-law
clause, the court will look first to the choice-of-law rules of the state in
which the court sits to determine what law governs the contract 250 and
246 See text accompanying notes 239-45 supra.
247 Courts that have not applied federal law to forum-selection clauses have often applied
the law of the state in which they are located, though the rationales for doing so have differed.
See, e.g., Cutter v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 510 F. Supp. 905, 909 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (applying
Wisconsin law to forum-selection clause where Wisconsin statute governs "a substantial por-
tion of the plaintiff's action"); Kolendo v. Jerell, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 983, 987 (S.D. W. Va.
1980) (applying West Virginia law to Texas forum-selection clause, after determining that
either West Virginia or Pennsylvania law governed agreement, since forum law governs "mat-
ters respecting the bringing of the suit"); Leasewell, Ltd. v. Jake Shelton Ford, 423 F. Supp.
1011, 1014 (S.D. W. Va. 1976) (applying West Virginia law to question of enforceability of
New York forum-selection clause since West Virginia conflicts rules "require that West Vir-
ginia law be applied to the contract" when execution and performance occur in West Virginia).
248 See note 172 supra.
249 There is an argument that the law governing the interpretation of the clause should not
necessarily determine its enforceability. Judge Posner seemed to imply this in dictum in
Northwestern Natl Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 374 (7th Cir. 1990), in which he
stated:
Validity and interpretation are separate issues, and it can be argued that as the rest of
the contract in which a forum selection clause is found will be interpreted under the
principles of interpretation followed by the state whose law governs the contract, so
should that clause be. But this is another issue we need not decide; neither side invokes
any interpretative principles founded on a particular state's law.
Id.
However, although validity (or enforceability) and interpretation may be separate issues,
the enforceability of the forum-selection clause may be determined in part by whether it is
interpreted to be exclusive or nonexclusive. See note 10 supra. Perhaps more important, the
enforceability of a forum-selection clause is a reflection of its interpretation. See Central Coal
Co. v. Phibro Energy, 685 F. Supp. 595, 597 (W.D. Va. 1988) (applying contractually stipu-
lated New York law to "interpretation and application of the forum selection clause").
2M See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487,496 (1941) (federal court sitting
in diversity must apply choice-of-law rules of state in which it sits).
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thus the forum-selection clause. So, for example, a federal district court
in New York would look to New York's choice-of-law rules to determine
the body of law applicable to the contract. If it determines that Califor-
nia law governs the contract, it will construe the forum-selection clause
under California law. This approach is not commonly seen where the
contract does not contain a choice-of-law provision,251 but it nevertheless
has support from some cases and commentators. 252
Where a contract contains a choice-of-law clause, the court should
take the same approach, but with an additional step. The court again
should look to the choice-of-law rules of the state in which it sits. But
the task then is to apply those rules to determine the enforceability of the
contract's choice-of-law (as opposed to choice-of-forum) provision.253
Since reasonable choice-of-law clauses generally are enforceable,25
251 See note 256 infra. However, courts in the Third Circuit, which, at least prior to Stew-
art, applied state law to forum-selection clauses, see note 228 supra, discussed which state's
law would apply. Confronted with a contract with no choice-of-law clause, at least one court
considered which state's law to apply to the forum-selection clause. See Mutual Fire, Marine
& Inland Ins. Co. v. Barry, 646 F. Supp. 831, 833 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (determining that either
Colorado or Pennsylvania law would be applied, but not deciding which, as they had similar
law on forum-selection clauses).
252 See, e.g., Snavely's Mill v. Officine Roncaglia, S.P.A., 678 F. Supp. 1126, 1129 (E.D. Pa.
1987) ("Mhe enforceability of a forum selection clause is governed by state law, specifically,
that of the jurisdiction whose law controls the construction of the contract."); see also Gruson,
supra note 2, at 186 ("Most federal courts that have considered this question and that have not
applied federal law have applied the law governing the contract to determine the enforceability
of forum-selection clauses." (footnotes omitted)). Apparently, this approach also is followed
by Canadian courts. One commentator stated that in Canada,
[i]t is well established that the interpretation of a contract is governed by its proper law.
In this regard a jurisdiction clause should be treated no differently from any other clause
in the contract. Consequently, the issue of whether a jurisdiction clause is exclusive in
nature should be determined by the proper law of the contract and not by [local law].
Robertson, Jurisdiction Clauses and the Canadian Conflict of Laws, 20 Alberta L. Rev. 296,
312 (1982), quoted in Instrumentation Assocs. v. Madsen, 859 F.2d 4, 8 (1988) (footnotes
omitted).
253 See, e.g., Leasewell, Ltd. v. Jake Shelton Ford, 423 F. Supp. 1011, 1014 (S.D. W. Va.
1976) (stating in reference to combination choice-of-law/forum-selection clause, "[i]n choosing
which law to apply to this clause, it is obvious that the contract should be tested under which-
ever law is applicable had the questioned provision not been in the contract.... To do other-
wise would be to permit the clause to 'pull itself up by its own bootstraps.'" (citations
omitted)).
254 Choice-of-law provisions are recognized as enforceable by the Uniform Commercial
Code and the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. See U.C.C. § 1-105(1) (1987); Re-
statement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 80, 187 comment b (1971). Since there are several
approaches to conflict-of-laws issues, a full discussion of which is beyond the scope of this
Note, the analysis of such clauses may vary. See Gruson, supra note 10, at 209. The reason-
able-relation test often is applied. See, e.g., Woods-Tucker Leasing Corp. v. Hutcheson-In-
gram Dev. Co., 642 F.2d 744, 749-53 (5th Cir. 1981); Carefree Vacations v. Brunner, 615 F.
Supp. 211, 215 (W.D. Tenn. 1985) ("In a multi-state transaction, the contracting parties'
choice-of-law provision is valid absent contravention of public policy of the forum state or a
showing that the selected forum does not bear a reasonable relationship to the transaction."
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courts should, on this analysis, uphold the choice-of-law provision and
then apply that law to determine the enforceability of the forum-selection
clause.255
Several cases have taken the approach of applying the parties' choice
of law to the forum-selection clause.256 In one case, for example, the
(citation omitted)); see also Gruson, supra note 10, at 2!6 ("[I]deally, any choice of law which
has a reasonable basis should be given effect." (footnote omitted)).
255 See Gruson, supra note 2, at 156. One exception to the enforcement of forum-selection
clauses is if a court finds enforcement contrary to the public policy of the state in which it sits.
See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972). Although disputed by at least
one commentator, see Gilbert, Choice of Forum in International and Interstate Contracts, 65
Ky. L.J. 1, 39-40 (1976-77), this limitation should not be a concern insofar as giving effect to a
choice-of-law clause in turn effects a change of venue through a forum-selection provision.
Nor should comity be used to justify a court's refusal to enforce the forum-selection clause on
the basis of the public policy of the contractual forum.
256 See, e.g., In re Diaz Contracting, Inc., 817 F.2d 1047, 1050 (3d Cir. 1987) (applying
parties' contractual stipulation of New York law to forum-selection clause); General Eng'g
Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, 783 F.2d 352, 357 (3d Cir. 1986) (Virgin Islands court
applying Maryland law selected in contract to forum-selection provision); Hoes of Am., Inc. v.
Hoes, 493 F. Supp. 1205, 1207-08 (C.D. I. 1979) (enforcing forum-selection clause under
German law provided for in choice-of-law provision); Wellmore Coal Corp. v. Gates Learjet
Corp., 475 F. Supp. 1140, 1143-45 (W.D. Va. 1979) (law of Virginia forum would require
Arizona law stipulated in choice-of-law clause to apply to forum-selection clause providing for
Arizona forum); Taylor v. Titan Midwest Constr. Corp., 474 F. Supp. 145, 147 (N.D. Tex.
1979) (dictum) (Texas federal court noting that "[i]f under Texas conflicts law this were
viewed as primarily a question of contract law, then arguably a Texas court would apply Mis-
souri law to its resolution, in view of the contractual choice-of-law provision"); Goff v.
AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, 313 F. Supp. 667, 669-70 (D. Md. 1970) (Maryland fed-
eral court applying Pennsylvania law selected in choice-of-law clause to forum-selection provi-
sion). This approach also is advocated by at least one commentator. See Gruson, supra note
2, at 185-92; Gruson, supra note 10, at 209-16; see also Comment, supra note 2, at 1097 n.34
("Most states applying state law to the question of enforceability have applied the contractual
choice of law, resulting in uniform outcomes regardless of which circuit is deciding the mat-
ter." (citing Gruson, supra note 2, at 185-86)).
Another commentator disagrees with this view. See Mullenix, supra note 33, at 351 (rais-
ing question of whether choice-of-law analysis should precede analysis of forum-selection
clause itself and noting that courts traditionally construe forum-selection clauses without any
consideration of choice-of-law provision). However, where the determination of the proper
forum depends on a contractual provision, the better approach seems to be to determine the
law governing interpretation of the contract and interpret the clause under that law, assuming
Stewart is inapposite because the enforcement mechanism is other than § 1404(a). See notes
227-28 and accompanying text supra.
The selection of the governing law that also should apply to the forum-selection clause
depends cn whether the conflict-of-laws rules of the forum state consider the enforceability of a
forum-selection clause a procedural issue Cin which case it would apply forum law) or an issue
of contract law (in which case it would apply the law governing the contract). See Gruson,
supra note 2, at 186. Generally courts apply the law governing the contract. Id.
The Supreme Court in Stewart did not mention this issue despite the presence of a choice-
of-law clause; it did not have to reach this question since it held that the federal transfer statute
controlled the forum-selection clause. See Stewart Org., Inc., v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 28-
29 (1988). The Eleventh Circuit had raised the issue in an opinion that later was vacated. See
Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 779 F.2d 643, 647 n.8 (11th Cir. 1985), vacated, 785 F.2d
896 (1lth Cir. 1986), rev'd per curiam, 810 F.2d 1066 (1lth Cir.) (en banc), aff'd on other
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court stated:
the question of what law governs this contract (and hence the enforce-
ability of its forum selection clause) must be determined in the first
instance by Virgin Islands law.... In this case, the parties specified
that the contract was to be governed by the law of Maryland. There-
fore the enforceability of the forum selection clause in this case is gov-
erned by Maryland law. 257
This approach is sensible: the court is being asked to interpret a clause of
the agreement, and if the parties' choice-of-law clause is enforceable
under forum law, it should govern the applicability of the forum-selec-
tion clause.
III
FORUM-SELECTION CLAUSE ENFORCEMENT:
THE STRATEGIC OPTIONS
As the above discussion illustrates,258 Stewart Organization, Inc. v.
Ricoh Corp.259 has created much uncertainty for forum-selection clause
enforcement, particularly under the statutory transfer mechanism, 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a). Although Stewart renders certainty of forum-selection
clause enforcement unlikely, there are options that nevertheless will aid
in achieving such enforcement.
At the drafting stage, an attorney who is aware of the potential diffi-
culties in enforcing forum-selection clauses in diversity oases also should
include a choice-of-law provision providing for interpretation of the con-
tract, and specifically the forum-selection clause, under the internal prin-
ciples of a state that routinely enforces forum-selection clauses.260 This
may be the best hope a party has for securing enforcement of the forum-
selection clause even if the other party commences suit in a state that
disfavors forum-selection clauses. 261
grounds, 487 U.S. 22 (1988). However, the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning was faulty. It re-
jected the applicability of Klaxon v. Stentor, 313 U.S. 487 (1941), stating "the issue in this
case, however, is not the legitimacy of a choice of law clause. Both states enforce such clauses.
Rather we are asked to enforce a choice of forum clause." Stewart, 779 F.2d at 647 n.8 (em-
phasis in original). The court's statement is correct as far as it goes, but it does not address the
proper issue. If state, not federal, law were to apply, the next determination would be which
state's law to apply even though the issue was the enforceability of a forum-selection clause,
not a choice-of-law provision. See text accompanying notes 247-48 supra. Since there was a
choice-of-law clause in the contract that forum law would validate, presumably New York law
would be applied, and the forum-selection clause would be enforced.
257 General Eng'g Corp., 783 F.2d at 358.
258 See text accompanying notes 175-232 supra.
259 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
260 See notes 172, 255 supra.
261 In addition, on a § 1404(a) motion, a choice-of-law clause may affect the transfer deci-
sion, since one factor in the transfer determination is the relative familiarity of the transferee
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The defendant 262 who has been haled into a forum other than the
one selected in the clause,263 and who wishes to see the forum-selection
clause enforced, has several remedies at her disposal. Theoretically, she
may bring an action for breach of contract.264 If there are meritorious
issues that require resolution, probably the best course of action for the
defendant seeking forum-selection clause enforcement is to commence a
second suit in the contractual forum. 265 However, she still must appear
forum with the substantive law to be applied. See, e.g., Heller Fin. v. Midwhey Powder Co.,
883 F.2d 1286, 1293 (7th Cir. 1989); Heller Fin. v. Shop-A-Lot, 680 F. Supp. 292, 296 (N.D.
IlM. 1988) ("justice requires that, whenever possible, a diversity case should be decided by the
court most familiar with the applicable state law"); Lafayette Coal Co. v. Gilman Paper Co.,
640 F. Supp. 1, 2 (N.D. IM. 1986) (transferring case to Georgia because Georgia law applied).
A forum-selection clause that specifies the same state as the choice-of-law clause would in-
crease the likelihood of a transfer to that forum.
262 Venue objections generally are not raised by the court since venue limitations are
deemed to protect the convenience of the defendant, not to infringe upon the court's power to
adjudicate. See note 31 supra. Thus, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(1) provides that a
defense of improper venue is waived if it is not timely made. A federal court can consider a
transfer under § 1404(a) of its own initiative, see Mills v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 886 F.2d 758,
761 (5th Cir. 1989), but this is relatively rare. But cf. Stanley Works v. Globemaster, 400 F.
Supp. 1325, 1338 (D. Mass. 1975) (asking parties for assistance in determining advisability of
transfer from Massachusetts to Texas).
263 See Gruson, supra note 2, at 136-37 ('Litigation questioning the enforceability of exclu-
sive forum-selection clauses usually arises before... excluded fora, which would, but for the
clause, have jurisdiction."). If the suit is brought in the contractual forum, the issue of the
enforceability of the clause does not arise unless one party seeks to move the suit out of the
contractual forum and into another forum. See note 84 supra. Where a defendant to an action
brought in the correct forum attempts to obtain removal, transfer, or dismissal of the case, the
situation is analytically distinct. In such cases, the plaintiff must assert the forum-selection
clause as a barrier to such dismissal or transfer. The forum-selection clause thus is balanced
against the policies favoring the defendant's freedom to move the case out of the original fo-
rum. Most of the legal scholarship and case law addressing forum-selection clauses is limited
to the scenario of suit in a noncontractual forum. This Note also limits itself to this context.
264 See Gruson, supra note 2, at 137 n.10. Few cases have considered this possibility. Id.
But see Venners v. Kimball Int'l, 749 F. Supp. 714,715 (E.D. Va. 1990) (defendants in wrong-
ful termination action filed counterclaim for breach of employment contract based on com-
mencement of suit in noncontractual forum).
265 See Unterweser Reederei G.m.b.H. v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 2 Lloyd's Rep. 158 (C.A.
1968) (defendants to American action brought in violation of forum-selection clause initiated
proceeding in contractual forum of England). A related proceeding pending in another forum
may affect the decision to transfer to that forum under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). See Freiman v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 38 F.R.D. 336 (N.D. IM. 1965).
Theoretically, the defendant may obtain an injunction against suit in the noncontractual
forum, thereby securing enforcement of the forum-selection clause. However, comity concerns
make courts understandably reluctant to grant such injunctions. See Alabama Power Co. v.
Tennessee Valley Auth., 92 F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 1937) (abuse of discretion to enjoin party from
proceeding with suit). Even if an injunction is granted, it cannot be directed at a court, only at
the parties, see Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 121 (1980); thus, the first court need not
honor it and may even issue a counterinjunction prohibiting suit elsewhere, although this is
extremely unlikely. Cf. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 559 F. Supp. 1124,
1127 n. 11 (D.D.C. 1983) (party obtained injunction against counterinjunction that would pre-
vent British action).
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in the action that is proceeding in the wrong forum to prevent default.266
It is in that forum that the important question of the best mechanism to
enforce the forum-selection clause arises. It is particularly important to
choose a motion or motions to enforce the clause that have a strong like-
lihood of being granted, for, if they fail, there is little chance of interlocu-
tory267 or postjudgment review. 268
When appearing in the noncontractual forum, the defendant may
make a motion to dismiss or transfer the action to the proper forum.
269
She also may make a "motion to dismiss based on the forum-selection
clause" without citing a particular statute or rule.270 For the attorney
who wishes to choose particular motions, a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(3) is still a good choice under present law, as it arguably does not
implicate Stewart, 271 and its use has been upheld in several cases. 272 It
may be joined with a forum non conveniens motion and a motion to
dismiss based on the forum-selection clause per se. Alternatively, if a
court seems likely to apply a state law disfavoring forum-selection
clauses, a section 1404(a) transfer motion may be desirable because it will
be governed by federal law. 273 However, while a section 1404(a) transfer
is often a litigator's first impulse, the choice to use that method should
not be made without hesitation since enforcement of the clause is discre-
tionary.274 Two section 1404(a) factors that may aid enforcement of the
forum-selection provision are a choice-of-law clause in the contract speci-
fying the law of the chosen forum 275 and a pending related action in the
266 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
267 See Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495 (1989) (no interlocutory review of
12(bX3) motion to enforce forum-selection clause); text accompanying notes 100-01 supra.
268 Review of a §§ 1404(a) or 1406(a) transfer motion may be unavailable after final judg-
ment as a matter of law. See note 100 supra. More important to defendants seeking trial in the
correct forum, review after final judgment is not worth very much. See Farmland Indus. v.
Frazier-Parrott Commodities, 806 F.2d 848, 850-51 (8th Cir. 1986) (noting that order denying
forum-selection clause enforcement effectively was unreviewable after final judgment because
right to single trial in preselected forum already was lost); Note, Appealability of a District
Court's Denial of a Forum-Selection Clause Dismissal Motion: An Argument Against "Can-
celing Out" The Bremen, 57 Fordham L. Rev. 463, 471 (1988) ("It is the loss of... the right
to avoid being forced to litigate in a court other than the one agreed to that makes [such] an
order... effectively unreviewable after final judgment."); text accompanying note 101 supra.
269 See text accompanying notes 69-76 supra.
270 One commentator labels this "pleading around Stewart." See Note, supra note 122, at
327 n.145. Even if that characterization is accurate, such a motion is perfectly proper, as the
Stewart decision did not mandate the use of § 1404(a) but rather made its Erie decision in the
§ 1404(a) context because that was the posture in which the case arose. See Stewart Org., Inc.
v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 25 (1988).
271 See notes 226-27 and accompanying text supra.
272 See note 74 supra.
273 See Stewart, 487 U.S. at 28.
274 See id. at 29-30; text accompanying notes 218-20 supra.
275 See note 261 supra.
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contractual forun. 276 However, the section 1404(a) motion may be ac-
companied by problems for the defendant seeking a trial in the contrac-
tual forum.277
CONCLUSION
A forum-selection clause should memorialize an agreement between
contracting parties regarding the situs of possible future litigation. In a
perfect world, the principles enunciated in The Bremen v. Zapata Off-
Shore Co.278 would be applied to enforce valid forum-selection clauses
and to deny enforcement of those obtained improperly. In that perfect
world, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would contain a rule specifi-
cally providing for a motion for the enforcement of forum-selection
clauses, thereby eliminating the confusion over where to pigeonhole these
clauses. In addition, a federal statute designed for forum-selection clause
enforcement in the federal courts would codify the Bremen standard,
thus resolving the Erie problem.
Unfortunately, however, under current law there is no such ideal
"Zapata" motion, and defense attorneys must use other procedural de-
vices to argue for forum-selection clause enforcement. In fact, the
Supreme Court has cut back the reach of The Bremen in nonadmiralty
cases.279 In an imperfect world without a "Zapata" motion and a federal
forum-selection clause statute, decisions like Stewart that are limited to a
specific factual context only complicate an already muddled situation.
The present procedural thicket renders it more difficult for attorneys to
obtain enforcement of forum-selection clauses, but some day the pendu-
lum should swing back toward the principles of The Bremen v. Zapata
Off-Shore Co.
276 See text accompanying note 265 supra. A pending proceeding in another forum is a
factor in the transfer decision. See note 88 supra.
277 See text accompanying notes 87-103 supra.
278 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
279 See text accompanying note 213 supra. Of course, The Bremen retains full vitality in
admiralty cases. See Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991).
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